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Summary 
Most of the rural population in Mozambique operates totally outside the reach of any financial 
sector operator. Nearly all of the rural districts have no formal banking facilities at all. The 
microfinance sector is small and has an urban and peri-urban orientation, while both the 
community-based financial arrangements and development credit institutions have a very limited 
outreach in rural areas. This institutional situation makes it very difficult for the financial sector 
to respond to the increasing demands for rural financial services in the country and today 
practically all seasonal agricultural credit to smallholders is provided by marketing and 
processing companies under interlocking arrangements. 
These interlocking arrangements vary from the contract farming to the farmers’ cooperatives. 
This study focuses on the contract farming type of coordination. It refers to a situation where the 
contractor agrees on providing inputs and extension services, and expects that the farmer in 
return provide the input for the agro-processing industry. The contractor can be from the small 
commercial entity to the enormous agro-processing industry. This arrangement has the potential, 
according to the literature reviewed, to alleviate the problems arising in the contractual 
arrangements, like moral hazard and asymmetric information that generates market failures. It 
also is considered as potential credit channel to the smallholders in rural areas, once they are 
targeted by the credit market failure. 
The operations and traditional production technology of the typical family farm, and its 
associated credit needs, are too small to warrant the economic extension of the formal credit 
system. In the short term it can not be expected that the commercial banks would reconsider their 
strategies of market expansion into agricultural commerce. This study aims to assess to what 
extent contract farming can be considered as one attenuating instrument of the hindered rural 
financial sector. The study draws upon the contract farming scheme practiced by the MLT – 
Mozambique Leaf Tobacco Ltd and DIMMON – Tabacos de Moçambique, in the Tete province. 
The data was collected using standard and simple, but credible, methodology. The data was 
obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture, Centro de Promoção de Investimentos (CPI) and 
some private institutions and individuals. For the confirmation and additional information on the 
CF scheme, the company’s management were contacted. 
In terms of the data analysis three main approaches were taken to gradually increase 
confirmation of the proposed hypothesis. One was a triangulation of positivism, post positivism 
and logical empiricism in order to consider both quantitative and qualitative information. 
Secondly, Econometrics approach was used. It helped to inspect the sample, through sample 
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mean tests, student t-test and one-way analysis of variance. In addition to this, regression 
analysis were also used, namely Linear and Logistic (Logit), in order to assess the hypotheses 
derived for the topic of the study. And finally the case study method which allowed the analysis 
of a specific case from Mozambique, already mentioned above, being the case of the Tete 
province’s tobacco agro-industrial companies. 
The results it’s of the regressions ran, suggest that the location (district), the land proportion 
reserved for each type of crop, the hand tools endowment, level of credit in terms of value are 
important determinants for the success of the CF’s credit scheme as alternative source of credit 
for the tobacco growers of Tete province. The regressions showed also that there is a relation 
between the income per member of the household and their characteristic, but it is not as strong 
to support the idea that their characteristics explain why they are better off under the CF scheme. 
But it also does not reject the idea that growers characteristics, like the household size, their core 
activities, whether is farming or/and outside farming, do show some important effects on their 
well being. 
As to conclusions, the agro-industrial CF scheme was shown to be a good alternative to alleviate 
the credit constraint problem. The results also suggest that CF can be used as a way to link small-
scale farmers with agribusiness, on condition that the correct governance structures, good 
relation between the parties and reduction of transaction cost are taken into account. But at the 
same time it is also clear that company credit is not, and does not aim to be, a substitute for the 
operations of the financial institutions. The range of financial services provided by the marketing 
companies is very narrow, consisting in most cases only of small in-kind seasonal loans. 
From different alternatives of coordination options that came up, it was clear that not a unique 
one of them could be considered as the most appropriate one in order to attenuate the problem 
analysed. The problem of the agriculture development goes beyond the credit issue to inputs and 
technology availability, access to markets, transportation and stocking facilities are few among 
the many existents. Thus there should by an integrated analysis of these issues in order to 
compute a strategic plan comprising both sectors, financial and agricultural, for the development 
of the agricultural sector.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. 
— Mao Tse Tung 
 
The Financial System is crucial for the allocation of resources in an economy across individuals, 
space and time, channels households’ savings to the corporate sector and allocates investment 
funds among firms. It allows inter-temporal smoothing of consumption by households and 
expenditures by firms through bank’s activities, when there is no substantial competition from 
the financial markets, and through derivatives and similar techniques of managing risk (cross 
sectional risk sharing), when there is significant competition from the financial markets (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). 
However, the assumptions considered by the classical theory, the competitive ideal, leaves out of 
account a number of increasingly important factors: agency problems between financial 
institutions and their customers, incomplete markets, transaction costs and asymmetric 
information. Due to those factors the companies internalize financial tasks themselves (e.g. 
investments are financed through retained earnings) to compensate the limitations of financial 
markets and intermediaries (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
Do all types of companies are able to internalize financial tasks themselves? The new companies, 
since they do not have any retained earnings on their early stage, depend on the external 
financing at some extent to start up. The smallholders are another type of entrepreneurs without 
this capacity. Hence not all types of companies can exercise the compensation function. The 
ones that are large enough and satisfy the formal financial sector’s requirements are the ones 
eligible to credit. Those companies will most probably be the ones involving medium or large 
scale activities. 
The Agro-industries is the type that can be able to get external finance on their early stage. Their 
particularity, which gave this study a topic to research on, is that they can on their turn give 
credit to their subordinates, their growers. These types of companies are characterized by, 
through vertical coordination with growers, buy and adding value to agricultural commodities 
through processing before they reach consumers. Four main types of arrangements are 
mentioned by theory: Spot Market (SM), Contract farming (CF), Vertical integration (VI), and 
Farmer Cooperatives (FC) (Rehber, 1998). 
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Rural agro-industrial development has the potential to help reduce the rural poverty level, which 
for Mozambique is about 71% in about 80% of the country’s population living in rural areas. The 
influence of a particular agro-industry in a given region varies depending on the set of factors 
that condition the relationship between the agro-industry and rural smallholders, from the crop 
specific characteristics to the economic and politic environment. The rural smallholders can 
benefit in terms of wage employment, increased income from the supply of raw material to the 
processing firms (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
Among the four institutional arrangements between the contractors and smallholders, mentioned 
above, matters only to the current study the CF contractual arrangement due to the fact it entails 
relations between growers and contractors that substitute for SM transaction and VI types of 
integration. A standard farming contract regulates in advance the price, production practices, 
product quality and credit facility among others (Rehber, 1998). CF is referred to a system where 
a contractor purchases the harvests of independent. The contractor frequently provides credit 
inputs and technical advice to the producer (Baumann, 2000). 
The attention given to the CF is also related to the many economic reforms in developing 
countries that have reduced public expenditure on credit programs, staple crop price supports, 
input subsidies and government research and extension programs (Key and Runsten, 1999). It 
substitutes, on one hand, the SM transaction alleviating the high marketing costs, fluctuating 
prices and information asymmetries problems, resulting from the poor endogenous political and 
economic factors in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), and on the other hand, the VI, reducing the 
likelihood of excluding large number of smallholders which would be high due to the adoption 
of high volumes of investments and the adoption of significantly high capital/labour ratios in 
production (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
Under this situation the arrangements of the CF’s credit schemes would be like a torch in the 
dark for the smallholders, which are restrained on access to traditional credit institutions. Thus 
research efforts towards a better understanding of that relationship and the potential it has to 
overcome the problematic access to credit experienced by the smallholders, to improve the real 
sector’s productiveness, and even to improve the infrastructural setting of the rural areas and lead 
to a development of a rural financial system, is relevant not only for the micro level, but also for 
the policy decisions. 
 
1.1. Presentation and motivation 
The Mozambican overall credit distribution, under the traditional financial system, among the 
different sectors of the economy is characterized by the stylized fact that higher percentage of the 
credit is channelled to the industry and commercial (an average of 29.99% and 20.31% 
respectively, during the 1998-2001 period) activities, which are not considered the main clutch 
for the development in some developing countries. Here the productive sector, specifically the 
agricultural sector, has been getting low percentage of the overall credit distribution (an average 
of 19.18% during the 1998-2001 period), in spite of being considered the activity that employs 
most of the (rural) population and the main clutch for the development of the country. 
Table 1.1 Sectored credit distribution, 1998-2001 (in MZM1 106) 
Source: ACP, 2003. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 Sectors 
Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Agriculture 1,220,812.00 20.98 1,675,196.00 19.86 1,894,657.00 19.07 2,486,830.00 16.80 
Industry 1,718,482.00 29.53 2,463,797.00 29.21 2,676,773.00 26.94 3,296,171.00 22.26 
Construction 277,992.00 4.78 395,233.00 4.69 449,671.00 4.53 507,108.00 3.42 
Tourism n.a. n.a. 68,918.00 0.83 216,873.00 2.18 433,251.00 2.93 
Commerce 1,470,807.00 25.27 1,864,832.00 22.12 2,027,907.00 20.42 1,987,667.00 13.43 
Transport. and 
Communications 363,831.00 6.25 426,078.00 5.05 519,216.00 5.24 931,429.00 6.29 
Other 767,295.00 13.19 1,537,572.00 18.23 2,149,155.00 21.63 5,162,084.00 34.86 
Total 5,819,219.00 100.00 8,433,615.00 100.00 9,936,216.00 100.00 14,806,541.00 100.00 
As can be seen on the Table 1.1, agricultural sector has been receiving a considerable level of 
credit from the economy. But when we look at the distribution of the credit by crops, on the 
Table 1.2, clearly comes out the higher allocation of the credit to the cash crop industry (the 
large agricultural companies and the agro-industries) producing cotton, cashew and sugar (an 
average of 23.44%, 13.18% and 7.42% respectively during the 1998-2001 period). Under this 
framework and considering that major part of the national agricultural produce comes from 
family farms, absorbing most of the working population, the agricultural companies and the 
agro-industries seems to be in better position towards the formal financial system (for credit) 
than the smallholders. 
Table 1.2 Credit distribution by crops, 1998-2001 (in MZM 106) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 Crops 
Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Tea 26,164.00 2.33 37,917.00 3.03 43,956.00 2.43 n.a. n.a. 
Sugar cane 82,683.00 7.36 n.a. n.a. 137,869.00 7.62 164,813.00 7.26 
Cashew 195,554.00 17.42 58,366.00 4.66 277,488.00 15.34 347,206.00 15.30 
Copra 51,721.00 4.61 61,638.00 4.92 100,292.00 5.54 273,518.00 12.05 
Cotton 208,157.00 18.54 322,517.00 25.74 370,721.00 20.49 658,057.00 29.00 
Other 558,480.00 49.74 772,349.00 61.65 878,787.00 48.58 825,675.00 36.39 
Total 1,122,759.00 100 1,252,787.00 100 1,809,113.00 100 2,269,269.00 100 
Source: ACP, 2003. 
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1 MZM stands for Mozambican Meticais, the Mozambican currency, and USD 1 = MZM 20,650.00, on 22.04.2005 In 
www.bancomoc.mz . 
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A research towards a better understanding of the credit distribution shown above would probably 
be taken in different forms. Depending on the approach taken, it would help on one hand 
understand the reasons of the credit market failure (for smallholder’s agricultural activity) and 
identify different strategies to tackle that problem. On the other hand, it would understand the 
role of the agro-industry as the link between the formal financial system and the rural 
smallholder and as the pivot element for the development of the rural financial system. 
The study proposed will follow the latter approach. Given that major part of the credit given to 
the agricultural sector goes to the agro-industries, it is crucial to understand the role of the agro--
industrial sector for the improvement of the agricultural productivity. Therefore research in order 
to understand the Agro-industry’s credit schemes, specifically CF activity as an alternative (if 
not the unique) credit source for the rural growers, will be followed. The approach to be taken in 
the paper will be both, micro and macro perspective, portrayed on lessons learned from the 
experiences of the Agro-industries and growers located in the Tete province, on the tobacco 
sector, and from the documented worldwide experiences. 
 
1.2. Objectives and hypothesis 
The specific objectives with the study are as follows: 
1) Analysis of the factors explaining the credit constraint situation for the rural growers 
towards the traditional financial sector; 
2) Review of different financial options for smallholders as alternative credit source to the 
traditional financial sector; 
3) Understanding of the CF scheme as a credit source and of the factors influencing the 
credit activity of the scheme; 
4) Derive implications for the sector’s stakeholders and for the policy makers to take into 
account. 
The following research questions are central for the study: 
1) Which are the aspects of the traditional financial systems that hinder the credit supply to 
the rural growers? 
2) Do the Agro-industry’s CF schemes provide an alternative source of credit for the grower 
located in the rural areas in Mozambique? 
The hypotheses that will guide this study are given as follows: 
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1) H1 –The CF schemes can be considered as an alternative way to reach the rural growers, 
in terms of financial system’s main developmental channel: the credit; 
2) H2 – Growers characteristics, grower’s endowment of factors of production and socio-
economic characteristics, explain why they are better off under the CF then the other 
credit systems, specifically the formal financial system, NGOs credit system, Rural 
Associations, government credit, and retailer credit system. 
 
1.3. Organization of the study 
First a general presentation of the country, allowing the understanding of some of the historically 
existing conditions of the financial and agricultural sector, which are the basis of the thesis. It 
includes a description of the agricultural and financial sectors, drawing the current status, 
performance and their relationship. A special section will be devoted to characterization of the 
rural market, in terms of their functional and organizational aspects and the interaction between 
the financial and agricultural sectors in this market. 
The following chapter aims to present the theoretical grounds of the study. Here a conceptual 
view of which are the problems arising from market failure, whether its credit, informational, 
insurance or product markets failures will be presented, under the CF scheme. In addition a 
characterization of the rural, in terms of the types of vertical coordination existent, of the 
household decision making process and a presentation of the CF scheme, from the historical 
background, the factors behind it, organizational and functional points, to the main determinants 
of the CF scheme. 
A description of the methodology used in data collection and analysis, mainly, will be 
undertaken in the fourth chapter. The next chapter presents case study evidence, from the 
tobacco growers in Tete province of Mozambique. Following, the study provides an in-depth 
discussion regarding the potential of the scheme as credit source including the possibility of 
generalization of the scheme in the way that it can be beneficial for the development of the rural 
areas. And as final chapter, before the references, concluding remarks will be presented. 
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2. The Mozambique context 
 
The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but 
wiser people so full of doubts. 
— Bertrand Russell 
 
This chapter presents the background information about Mozambique, which helps to describe 
the empirical setting of the study. This contextual background allows understanding some of the 
historically existing conditions of the financial and agricultural sector, which are the basis of the 
thesis. The chapter is organized into three broader sections. The first section outlines how the 
contextual background2 shapes the financial sector. In the third section, a description of the 
agricultural sector is provided, drawing upon the current status in terms of existing systems, 
economic performance and its relationship with industrial sector. The last section is reserved for 
the characterization of the rural markets, in terms of its structure, operators and both financial 
and agricultural activities. 
 
2.1. Financial sector 
2.1.1. General profile 
Historically Mozambican financial sector evolution, since the colonial era, can be grouped and 
described in the following three periods (de Abreu, 1999; CEA, 1990): 
i) Origin and consolidation of the financial sector in colonial period: which goes till 1975, 
is characterized by an organization, consolidation, diversification and by a geographical 
spreading of the sector. The Decreto-Lei 45296, of 8th October 1963, was the one that 
regulated all bank related activities in the províncias ultramarinas3 of that period. The 
central banks functions were belonged to the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU). The 
exchange rates were fixed administratively; 
ii) The transformation of colonial financial system: corresponding to the 1975-1986/7 
period, it is characterized by the creation of the central bank of an independent people’s 
republic, through an integration process of the banking sector and consequently 
monopolization by Government of the financial intermediation activities. Limitation of 
 
2 The contextual background, namely the socio-historic and political profile can be seen in the appendix A1. 
3 How the Portuguese overseas province were known. 
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financial product’s diversification and almost substitution of the financial intermediation 
role of the financial system by the allocation methods by the central plan of the 
government The target of the financial policy was unemployment rather than inflation. 
Interest rates and exchange rates were administratively fixed. Only one private bank was 
operational, i.e., the Banco Standard Totta de Moçambique (BSTM), in addition to the 
Bank of Mozambique (BoM) and Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD). The 
Mozambican currency, Metical, was created during this period, in 16.06.1980, by the 
Decreto-lei 2/80. Many problems aroused during this period: lack of investment and 
entrepreneurship’s incentives; low returns level on the capital, inefficient resource 
allocation, 70s petroleum crisis, Golf war and Soviet Union politico-economic crisis; 
which drove to a reform, the ESRP, in 1987, in order to introduce the market based 
system; 
iii) Financial reform under structural adjustment program: started in 1987, is characterized 
by the legal-institutional reform under ESRP, and conducted by the liberalization, 
diversification of activities within the sector and openness to the privates’ initiatives. A 
reform of the monetary policy’s instruments and management mechanisms, privatization 
of the Government owned banks, openness to the foreign market were also some 
remarkable evolutions of the period. This period also is characterized by the introduction 
of new products (e.g. ATMs, credit cards, debit cards) and services (e.g. Stock exchange). 
The use and standardization of the Check, the computerization of the banks also are worth 
to mention. The promotion of decentralized credit was another important measure taken 
by the reform. This period, according to the reform’s objectives, can be delimited into 
fours phases (BoM, 1999): 
(a) Increase of produce 1987-1990): in order to attain the increase of produce, the 
government started a liberalization process in 1985 of the agricultural, industrial and 
services products. A sectored programming of the credit was also realized, defining 
quantitative ceilings on credit activity of each bank, and interest rate definition by 
activity sector and credit use was also administered. The central bank accumulated 
the functions of, additionally to the Central’s, commercial banks. A separation of 
these functions was also an objective of the reform program. 
(b) Increase of external competitiveness (1990-1992): due to the appreciation of the 
Metical, through exchange rate adjustments devaluation started, firstly of high 
intensity, of about 30-40% in semester basis, between 1987/8, and then under 
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crawling peg method4, with monthly adjustments of below 5%, between 1989 and 
1991. During this period a market based foreign exchange secondary market was 
institutionalized and many started this activity. Interest rate liberalization was also 
another important measure of this period, in addition to the separation of the central 
bank’s commercial function; 
(c) Inflation control (1992-1997): as a result of the exchange rate liberalization, the 
inflation rate climbed in 1991 to worrying levels. In order to control it the BoM opted 
by introduction of the liquid internal assets method (as difference between M2 and 
liquid external assets) for the ceiling setting on the bank’s credit activity. From 1996, 
as result, the inflation level became attractive for the private investors, both domestic 
and foreign, in addition to functional foreign exchange law, controlled budgetary 
system and continuous and accelerated GDP growth; 
(d) Increase of liquid foreign reserves of the BoM: with the creation of the Inter-bank 
exchange market in the end of 1996, the need for the existence of a certain level of 
external reserves, measured in terms of import months, was clearly spotted. As a 
result of the reduction of the reserve rate to 12%, in 19975, and the role of lender of 
last resort played by the BoM created two major problems: liquidity increase in the 
financial sector and pessimism of the operators about the sustainability and stability 
of the foreign exchange market. In order to overcome this issue the inter-bank money 
market was created. And two committees were created in order accompany the 
monetary and exchange policy definition and implantation: CPMC (Counselor for 
Monetary and exchange policy) and CCMI (Coordination committee of the inter-bank 
markets). 
Currently the financial structure of the Mozambican financial system is regulated by the Lei nº 
15/99, of 1st November. It regulates and groups all the financial activities in two major types of 
institutions: the credit institutions, which comprise of banks, credit cooperatives and other which 
by law are considered institutions; and the financial societies, which comprise factoring, 
investment funds management, brokers, assets management, exchange bureaus activities and 
others classified by law as financial societies (Parliament Assembly, 1999). 
The financial sector currently is constituted by, in terms of credit institutions, Banco 
Internacional de Mocambique (BIM), Banco Autral (BA), BSTM, Banco Comercial e de 
 
4 It is a method used to achieve one desired adjustment in the currency exchange rate (up or down) by small percentages over a given period, 
rather than by major revaluation or devaluation. Some countries use a formula that triggers a change when certain conditions are met. Others 
change values frequently to discourage speculations. 
5 Currently the reserve rate is 9%. 
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Investimento e de Fomento (BCIF)6, Banco Internacional de Comercio (ICB), Uniao Comercial 
de Bancos (Moçambique) (UCB), African Banking Coorporation Mazambique, Banco de 
Desenvolvimento e Comercio de Moçambique, Banco Mecantil de Investimento (BMI), Novo 
Banco, Cooperativa de Credito e Investimentos (CREDICOOP), Cooperativa de Poupança e 
Credito (CPC), Tchuma – Cooperativa de Poupança e Credito, Banco Efisa, HSBC Equator 
Bank and about 12 small credit entities. And in terms of financial societies by BIM 
Investimentos (BIMI), BIM Leasing (BIML), BCI Leasing, African Banking Coorporation 
Leasing, Compras em grupo de Moçambique (CGM), Sociedade de Credito de Moçambique 
(SOCREMO), Sociedade de Gestão e Financiamento para a promoção da pequena e media 
empresas (GAPI), Sociedade de Capital de Risco and about 30 exchange bureaus (BoM, 2005). 
There also exists the Stock Exchange of Maputo. 
 
2.1.2. Credit market 
Lending to priority sectors at extremely low interest rates to stimulate economic activity had been the theme 
of monetary policy in Mozambique between 1981 and the introduction of the E(S)RP, and it continued to be a 
feature of the normal commercial credit system under E(S)RP. In particular, agricultural credit has attracted 
lower interest rates throughout the 1987-1990 period. At the start of 1990, for example, agricultural credit 
rates for 90 day loans were 15% compared to the 29% and 28% for the industrial and commercial sectors 
respectively.(CEA, 1990b:104) 
The extract above enlightens that credit policy, while the centrally planned system was ongoing, 
was basically based on administrative judgement and queuing mechanisms. Here the allocation 
of credit, definition of credit ceilings and definition of the interest rate (highly subsidized for the 
agriculture) for all the sectors were administrative, as a normal practice. With the ESRP, a 
change to the market based system and the commercial principles in the assessment of the credit 
are the ones ruling the credit activity of the banking sector. This raises many problems for the 
family sector, which are the most of the smallholders of the rural area, due to their inability to 
fulfil the commercial requirements of the credit. The credit activity in rural area of the country 
can be grouped, under the formal options, in three categories: i) Commercial banks; ii) 
Government or guarantee funds; and iii) Micro-credit institutions. Under the informal options 
there can be found three categories: i) Xitique; ii) goods as credit; and iii) Input as credit. 
The commercial banks are the main credit suppliers in the country, contributing with about 90% 
of the formal credit given to the economy, which grew in about 13% in 2001(KPMG, 2001). 
However, the agricultural activity has been funded by the banks through companies, where the 
 
6 Recently formed as merger od BancoComercial e de Investimento e Banco de Fomento. 
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rural traders and agro-enterprises are the ones worth to mention. The expansion of number of 
banks (and their branches throughout the provinces) has not been paced up with the increase of 
baking services in rural areas, especially in the credit activity. Instead the credit has been 
channelled to sector with high credit rolling, like commerce and services, minimum risk and the 
ones that have real guarantees and technical-financial sanity. On average more than 60% of the 
credit given through the banking system was as short term credit, during the 1998-2001 period 
(ACP, 2003; DNCI, 1999). 
Under the ESRP, in 1886, the government created Government funds for credit in order to fund 
the rural sector enhancement from which the following are mentioned: i) FFA (Fund for 
agriculture foment); ii) Commerce fund; iii) FARE (Fund for economic rehabilitation aid); iv) 
FDHA (Fund for hydraulic agriculture development); v) FFP (Fund for fishery foment); and vi) 
FFPI (Fund for small industry foment). Among all these only the first three included aid to 
agricultural activity. The total amount on these funds till present is approximately USD 72 
millions, from which only USD 61 millions were used. It financed around 180 projects that 
created 4210 jobs and maintained about 12000 jobs (Maleiane, 2002). As for the achievement of 
these funds there is a huge gap between the objectives previously defined and the ones achieved 
the recovery rate is low as result of increased credit not recovered, funds misapplication and lack 
of experience and readiness of the project managers on the projects analysis and credit 
monitoring (Maleiane, 2002). 
Initiated as aid projects to vulnerable population, war and natural disaster victims, implanted by 
the NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) with donors’ funds, the Micro-financial activity 
had as main objective to guarantee, through credit, minimum necessary resources to those 
already mentioned. Now it targets the low income urban and peri-urban areas population 
constrained to the formal credit. Even though it is in its initial phase, in institution and 
management view, it has conquered out many fans. Currently there are thirteen donor agencies, 
since 1992, and about USD 4.2 millions in terms of funds (DNCI, 1999). In terms of sectors they 
provide mostly to informal commerce (57%), agriculture (18%), manufacturing (15%) and 
services (10%), which shows its credit to consumption tendency rather than production (ACP, 
2003). Their credit value range from USD 24 to USD 600, and interest rate charged by them 
range from 50% to 100%, though not felt by the borrowers due to the short term of the credit. It 
is estimated that about 30 micro-financial institutions are operating, from which World Relief 
international, CCCP, CARE, Tchuma, SOCREMO and Novo Banco are considered the major 
ones (CARE, PNUD and ICC, 2000). 
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Xitique is a kind of forced savings in daily, weekly or monthly basis, realized normally by group 
of 4 to 10 persons, into a common fund which is given in a circular form to each member of the 
group. It works on the basis of trust and happens normally between neighbours, work mates and 
even close friends. The goods as credit7 is mostly practiced in rural and peri-urban areas, where 
instead of getting the fund as credit, the good itself is given as credit. This type of credit is 
mostly practiced under the livestock sector. The input as credit is the one that matters the most 
for the current study. It is practiced by big agricultural businesses, agricultural traders and by the 
agro-industrial sector on the cash crops like cotton, tobacco and sugar. Here the credit is given in 
the form of agricultural inputs, technical assistance and capacity building and depending on the 
specific case, these inputs are recovered, on harvest, buying the crops (discounting the input 
values) or by monetary repayment (ACP, 2003). 
As shown in the Table 1.1, agricultural sector has been receiving a considerable level of credit 
from the economy (an average of 19.18% during the 1998-2001 period). But on the distribution 
of the credit by crops, on the Table 1.2, clearly comes out the higher allocation of the credit to 
the cash crop industry (the large agricultural companies and the agro-industries) producing 
cotton, cashew and sugar (an average of 23.44%, 13.18% and 7.42% respectively during the 
1998-2001 period). Under this framework and considering that major part of the national 
agricultural produce comes from family farms, absorbing most of the working population, the 
agricultural companies and the agro-industries seems to be in better position towards the formal 
financial system (for credit) than the smallholders. 
Under the problematic issue of the formal financial system’s credit access by the family sector, 
the banking sector emanates the following reasons, as the one in the origin of the problem 
(DNCI, 1999): 
i) Agriculture’s high risk due to its dependence to the climate, aggravated by the fact that the 
country is cyclically affected by natural disasters (e.g. droughts , floods, insect plagues); 
ii) High costs associated with the selection and monitoring the credit beneficiaries of rural 
areas; 
iii) High risks associated with the low level of schooling and knowledge of business modern 
practices of the rural agents; 
iv) Smallholders lack of real guarantees and in some cases not existence of the land property 
and usage title; 
 
7 This type of credit is practiced by UGC (cooperatives general union) in Maputo, ADRC (Association for development of rural communities) in 
Gaza, SNV (Netherlands development organization); Concern in Nampula and AMODESE (Mozambican association for development) in Tete, 
In ACP (2003) 
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v) Most of the submitted projects are not accompanied by the respective financial plans and 
its viability study; 
vi) And weakness of the existent legal enforcement system. 
On the other hand, the farmers point out the following issues as reasons for not expansion of the 
credit throughout the agricultural sector (DNCI, 1999): 
i) High market interest rate and collateral requirements not adequate to them; 
ii) Real guarantees requirements that they don’t have; 
iii) Risk aversion behaviour of the banking sector; 
iv) Lack of political will on investing in agriculture from the banks part. 
A recent poverty report found that about 24% of the households had asked for credit in the last 
12 months, and in more than 50% of the cases the loan was asked to family or friends, 16% of 
the surveyed household went to the informal sources and only 13% went to the bank. The micro 
credit covered about 10%. About the pattern of the borrowers, it was seen that the illiterates did 
not asked for loans, the ones with primary schooling went to informal sources and the ones with 
higher schooling level went to banks. Of the small and medium enterprises surveyed, more than 
30% asked for loans, which more than half were covered by the informal sector, 35% by the 
banks and 35% by projects (G20, 2004). 
 
2.2. Agricultural sector 
2.2.1. General profile 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, yet only 4% of the land area is cultivated. Two-
thirds of the people are subsistence farmers, cultivating small plots using hand tools. Maize and 
cassava are the main staple food crops, but other cereals, groundnuts and beans are also grown. 
Important cash crops include prawns, cashew nuts, tea and sugar. Unfortunately, due to poor 
roads, many farmers lack access to markets for their surplus. Fear of hidden landmines also 
hampers rural development. Many households struggle to meet their own needs poor urban 
families spend more than 70 per cent of their income on food, and a crop failure can be 
disastrous for farmers. The basic diet of white maize or cassava made into porridge is high in 
carbohydrates but lacking in protein, vitamins and minerals (WV, 1999). 
Agricultural production is highly dependent on pluvial regimen. The northern region of the 
country has better potential for agriculture especially for dry land agriculture (risk of 5%), with 
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exceptions of south of Tete, north of Manica and Sofala, where the harvest risk can get about 
50%. The soils on the highlands, here, are in general of slightly argillaceous and frank-
argillaceous texture with high natural fertility, which needs maintenance in cultivation 
conditions. On the south the soils are mostly arenaceous, of low fertility water retention capacity. 
These bands of deposits of the rivers and its tributaries present one high agricultural potential 
and represent the majority of the areas recommended for the development of irrigated agriculture 
(AJAL, 1998).  
Mozambique has an enormous potential area for agriculture, estimated in about 36 millions 
hectares (ha), and only about 20% to 30% of it at maximum were cultivated, being currently 
about 5 millions ha the cultivated area. With a potential of irrigated lands of 3.4 millions of ha, 
the most important hydrographic basins are of the Umbelúzio, Incomati and Limpopo rivers in 
the south, and Búzi and Pungoé in the center, with about 400,000 ha. The area with the most 
potential is along the Zambeze river, dominating the centre of Mozambique and with the Cahora 
Bassa dam. Though it’s huge potential, in 1987 only 120.000 ha had infrastructures and only 
42.000 ha were operational. The irrigated land of Chokwé is the most important of the country 
with about 25.000 ha equipped to water, though the efficiency level of the irrigate is low, about 
25% to 50%, due to mainly lack of technical knowledge (AJAL, 1998). 
In about 70% to 90% of the currently cultivated area, the family sector has been developing 
subsistence agriculture, without inputs and with low income and where the women assumes a 
relevant role in the production. The large scale private sector has also been important due to its 
productive and commercialization functions. Exploring about 200,000 ha, this sector has the best 
productive areas, contributing strongly for the development of the food production and 
processing industry. The livestock, the main traction source of the family sector, have an 
important role in the rural economy. They are seen as source of organic material and way of 
consumption diversification (AJAL, 1998). The main characteristics of the farmers in 
Mozambique are summarized as following (Compton, 2000): i) Heterogeneous groups, from 
large scale private sector to small scale subsistence farmers; ii) Poorly organized, no 
organization can claim to represent small scale farmers at national level8; iii) Few farmers are 
concerned with demanding better agricultural services; and iv) Little real commitment to 
consultation with smallholder, not respecting and valuing their views. 
The agricultural area can be grouped in three vast zones: north, center and south. The north 
region, as already mentioned, has the higher agricultural potential, with medium altitudes and 
average annual precipitation between 1,000 e 1,400 mm zones. Maize, maripa and cassava are 
 
8 The National Union of Peasant Farmer (UNAC) aims this role in the long run, In Compton (2000). 
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the main crops of the plateaus and rice on the costal area. Tea and cotton are crops of high 
potential and tradition in areas where peanuts and tobacco are common crops. Cashew is 
predominant on the coast, where the risk of loss due to drought is less than 5%. The center with 
average annual precipitation between 1,000 and 1,200 mm, and is of medium altitude zone, is 
mainly subject to the hydrographic basin of the Zambeze river. Maize, cassava, mapira and bean 
dominate the produce, where the cash crops are cotton, cashew and copra. The risk due to the 
drought is higher that the northern region, and could get exceptionally to 30% to 60% in Tete 
province. As for the south region, maize, peanuts and cassava are predominant crops, in areas 
with precipitation between 400 e 600 mm. Cashew represents a very important source of income. 
In areas potentially irrigated, next to the riverbed, sweet potato and rice are grown, alternatively 
to barren zones where mapira and mexoeira are frown instead of maize. Comparatively to the 
costal area, in the inner land the probability of loss due to drought is rather high. Traditionally it 
is an area of livestock production, where the proximity to the urban areas facilitates the 
channeling of all produce (AJAL, 1998). 
 
2.2.2. Economic profile 
Agriculture is one of the major contributors to the countries GDP and exports. In 2000 and 2001, 
contributed in 20.2% and 18.8% respectively in the GDP, being the highest contribution (ACP, 
2003). An instrument for the coordination of the activities in the agricultural sector and at the 
same time to effect the changes in the MA needed for it to carry out its new role in a market 
economy was conceived, the PROAGRI. It based on around eight basic principles, agreed 
between both government and donors: i) Poverty reduction; ii) Decentralization and 
empowerment; iii) Good governance – transparency, accountability and participation; iv) 
Attention to gender issues; vi) Increased attention to rights and needs of smallholder farmers 
concerning access to land, input and markets; vii) Market oriented policy framework; and viii) 
MA’s activity limited to core functions and strengthened to carry them out (Compton, 2000). 
The estimated total cost of the first five year phase of PROAGRI is USD 202 million and till 
2000 eight donors9 had signed up to it. Operationally PROAGRI, integrates eight vertical 
components: i) Institutional development; ii) Research; iii) Agricultural extension; iv) Livestock; 
v) Support to crop production; vi) Agricultural land; vii) Forestry and wildlife; and viii) 
Irrigation; grouped in three thematic areas: Institutional development, Agricultural support 
services and Natural resource management. There are also ten horizontal components, divided by 
 
9 The donors were WB, EU, DANIDA, USAID, Netherlands, AusAid, FAO and UNDP. 
each province10. Till 2000, as a result of the progress assessment, there was a clear picture that 
there still was a long way to go (Compton, 2000). The challenges faced by PROAGRI are: i) 
Inability of agricultural sector to resolve problems in isolation11; ii) Lack of consensus about the 
scope, functions and target clients of the MA; iii) Lack of models (or agreed best practice) to 
institutionalize; and iv) Differing needs of different clients and geographical areas. 
When looking at the export structure of Mozambique it’s possible to notice that manufacturing 
has played an important role in exports, but clearly not a dominant one, though was the single 
largest exporter of goods until the early 1980s, mainly because of cashew processing (from the 
early 1970s, and cotton before that) and oil derivatives (Graph 2.1). Quite apart from the fact that 
service dominates total export revenue. The share of agriculture in exports12 increased 
significantly from 1994, mainly because of exports of unprocessed cashew nuts that replaced the 
exports of processed kernels (Castel-Branco, 2001). 
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Graph 2.1  Sectored composition of export goods  
Source: Castel-Branco, 2001. 
PPI’s investment program, 1980-82, had an immediate and short-lived impact on increase in 
imports. The import structure became skewed towards capital and intermediate goods, which, by 
1982, represented about 80% of total imports (Graph 2.2). Between 1983 and 1985 imports 
declined because the investment programme collapsed. Imports of capital goods fell, but imports 
of intermediate goods declined more dramatically. This was partly due to the falling world price 
of oil, but also to a general decline in imports of material inputs as, under foreign exchange 
constraints, these had to compete against capital investment and consumer goods. As a result, the 
level of under-utilised capacity throughout the economy, in particular in manufacturing, reached 
its peak (Castel-Branco, 2001). 
                                                 
10 For more detailed discussion of each vertical and horizontal components see Compton (2000). 
11 Without a market, farmers have little incentive to produce surplus, and on the other hand markets to exist need the production surplus to be 
available.  Three approaches, which does not fit neatly into PROAGRI, have had some success in breaking this deadlock: NGO initiatives to 
create market associations; decentralized, integrated local planning of local markets; and Outgrower schemes around processing facilities, In 
Compton (2000). 
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12 All agricultural based products that go through some level of industrial processing prior to export (sisal, tea, sugar and molasses, copra, cashew 
kernels, cotton ginned and spun) are counted as manufacturing exports. Thus, agricultural exports are exclusively unprocessed goods or those 
whose level of processing is either unknown or insignificant. 
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Graph 2.2  Sectored composition of import 
Source: Castel-Branco, 2001. 
 
2.3. Rural Markets in Mozambique 
2.3.1. Family sector and credit needs 
The agricultural activity contributes in about 20% to 25% to the GDP, from which about 80% are 
produced by the family sector. And about 70% of the overall population live in the rural areas on 
the basis of the agricultural activity. As in most African countries, the rural markets in 
Mozambique, also are not developed and face, among many set backs to their development, the 
following major four (Coates, 1999): 
i) Dispersion of the population and underdeveloped transport and communications 
infrastructures, which contributes positively to the unit costs for small transactions; 
ii) High risk associated with the crops in dry lands and the difficulties in diversification of 
that risk; 
iii) The seasonality of the agricultural activity increases the risk and probabilities of bad 
outcome affecting their stakeholders; 
iv) Lack of real guarantees that can be used as collateral, normally asked by the banks on 
lending process. 
Among the major concerns of the policy makers is the access to formal financial system and an 
appropriate marketing structure for the family sector, mostly the rural smallholder. Agriculture, 
in general, has not been constrained, but the family sector remains almost entirely outside the 
formal credit system. The operations and traditional production technology of the typical family 
farm, and its associated credit needs, are too small to warrant the economic extension of the 
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normal credit system. Moreover, family farms typically do not generate sufficient marketable 
surplus to justify or service commercial bank credit (CEA, 1990a, 1990b).  
Also connected to this problem is the development of an appropriate marketing structure. It 
seems that the imperfections of the actual marketing structure have resulted from, among others, 
the exodus of portuguese rural traders at independence (and not been replaced), the security 
problem and the serious shortcomings in the transportation and financial infrastructure. The 
behaviour of government policy with respect to pricing, resource allocation and the provision of 
the appropriate infrastructure are also contributing to the poor rural marketing and financial 
situation (CEA, 1990a). 
The low participation of the family sector in the formal financial system is attributed to the 
following factors (CEA, 1990b): 
i) Little demand for production credit from this sector, since the need for purchased inputs 
on the typical family farm at current technology levels is minimal considering the 
subsistence agriculture practiced by them; 
ii) With a mix of products marketed throughout the year, most consumption needs can be met 
without resorting to the credit use; 
iii) The low credit level of demand existing makes extremely costly the provision of it  
through the formal credit network; 
iv) Another important drawback to the credit expansion to the family sector is the evolution of 
the technology used in production. 
 
2.3.2. Rural market 
Multiple intervenients are present in the rural commercial circuit (Figure 2.1). There are the 
ambulantes also know as informal, the retailers, the wholesalers, the big traders, producers 
associations and the agro-industries. Each one of them operates and proportionate different 
access conditions to the market. The market itself can be classified as foreign and domestic, 
which can be local, regional and inter-provincial (DNCI, 1999). While competition among trader 
is present at the district level and to a lesser extent in the surrounding rural zones, the more 
distant are these are frequently characterized by monopolistic and monopsonistic trading. Thus, 
at the producer level, crop purchase and consumer good sale are often conducted by a single 
trader (CEA, 1990a). 
Ambulantes are part of the informal small traders that buy directly from the farmers and sell to 
the other agents, the retailers and wholesalers. The retailers and the wholesalers belong to the 
group of small and medium agent of the formal sector, which can also buy directly from the 
farmers and producers associations and sell to other retailers and wholesalers, to big traders and 
agro-industries. They have experience on commerce which allows to measure and manage their 
participation on agricultural commerce not only on the basis of the market behaviour but also 
their funding or borrowing capabilities. The big traders frequently pre-finance their buys from 
the smaller scale agents. The agro-industries intervene on this market strictly to buy what 
constitutes object of their industrial activity (DNCI, 1999). 
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Figure 2.1 Rural market circuit 
Source: DNCI, 1999. 
In general this circuit is not fully functional due to many constraints in the market. The low level 
and quality of the family farms, their dispersion and fluctuations on production level, particularly 
of food crops, makes the commerce activity less attractive to the agents due to the high 
transaction costs resulted from that, and additionally from the limited information about the 
markets, difficult access to the production areas. Access to credit, from the formal financial 
system, underdevelopment of infrastructural and transportation conditions, weak legal system 
and high bureaucracy, and information asymmetries are also contributing to the market failures 
(DNCI, 1999). 
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3. Literature review 
 
Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor, we would know 
much of the economics that really matters. Most of the world’s poor people earn their living from 
agriculture, so if we knew the economics of agriculture, we would know much of the economics of the 
poor. People who are rich find it hard to understand the behaviour of poor people. Economists are no 
exception. 
— T. W. Schultz (Nobel Laureate Lecture, 1979) 
 
This chapter aims to present the theoretical grounds related to what was proposed, in the 
introduction chapter, to carry out. Namely it draws upon the presentation of the different types of 
vertical coordination, characterizing the relation between the grower and the, as the first section. 
The second section comprises the main theoretical ground, upon which the relationships between 
two economic agents is analysed, the CF scheme. It presents from the historical background to 
the main determinants of the CF scheme. 
 
3.1. Inter-institutions relations in agriculture 
In Penn’s (1958) view, subsistence agriculture was fully integrated system itself since most of 
the production resources and production decisions are in the same hands. Form the seed 
collection to the crop harvesting; the rearing and fattening of an animal, and also the 
consumption after the seed reservation or stocking for the following period is one family’s 
activity. From the subsistence agriculture to the actual market oriented agriculture, a process of 
disintegration of functions has occurred. The most distinguishing feature of the present 
agricultural activity is specialization. Adding, Barker (1972) pronounces that agriculture as a 
production industry is, in one hand, related to the marketing activities that transform, transport 
and transfer processed produce to consumers, and on the other hand, with the large  industries 
supplying farm inputs. This way coordination between farms and other firms in the industry, 
both forward and backwards, is inevitable (Rehber, 1998). 
The need for more vertical coordination is responsive to the agricultural industrialization 
movement, which describes the significant structural changes in the food and fibre system 
(Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). Among a whole range of changes, two changes stand out: i) A 
shift from food commodities to food products; and ii) A shift from SMs to more direct market 
channels, such as production contracts. Two major forces drive the industrialization process: i) 
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New consumer, i.e., demanding more of quality, consistency and value, than just choice13; and ii) 
New producers, i.e., use of new technology such as bio- and information technology 
(Drabesntott, 1995). In addition i) Increasing competition from global market participants; ii) 
Economies of size and scope in production and distribution; iii) Risk mitigation and management 
strategies of buyers and suppliers; and iv) Strategic positioning and market power/control 
strategies of individual businesses; also contribute to the industrialization of agriculture (Kirsten 
and Sartorius, 2002). 
A plethora of different institutional arrangements14 can be found worldwide prevailing in the 
relationship between productions, trade, and processing. In Mozambique, those forms can be 
summarized in three different types defined on the basis of the degree of vertical coordination 
between farmers and off-farm businesses, namely: SM trading (coordination without any 
contract), CF and VI (ownership integration or plantation agriculture). Out of that continuum but 
interacting to a great extent in the dynamics of the markets is the FC (rural associations) 
(Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002; Rehber, 1998). In some countries, NGOs also play a role, 
as intermediaries, with the goal of helping those groups become profitable businesses 
associations. This section intends to describe those different types of institutional arrangements, 
also existing in literature, between agro-industries and smallholder farmers. 
 
Spot Market Trading 
Also named as coordination without any contract and open market transaction, the farmer buys 
the supplies from whom he chooses and sells his products to whoever will give the best offer in 
terms of price. The farmers here are independent and have no contractual (neither oral nor 
written) relations with any agent. This provides them, besides the freedom and flexibility to 
respond quickly to changes in market conditions, uncertainties about the markets (Rehber, 1998). 
Jaffee and Morton (1995) added that this type of arrangement provides economies in information 
as market prices reflect the information that trading parties require to interact efficiently, and that 
under this arrangement, each of participating parties make independent decisions based on its 
own conditions, preferences and the information available on preferences and behaviour of 
others. This arrangement is likely to be spread over larger geographical areas (Benfica, Tschirley 
and Sambo, 2002). 
This type of coordination is ideal for areas with low transaction costs in processing and 
marketing of crops are low and where various forms of institutional development that support 
 
13 Resulting from increasing concerns about food safety, link between diet and health and increased urbanization, In Drabesntott (1995). 
14 Institutional arrangements, coordination and vertical coordination will be used interchangeably. 
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service provision exists, or where factor and product markets operate efficiently (Delgado, 
1999). Examples of these types existing in Mozambique include, among others, cashew, maize, 
and mango sub-sectors. However in most of SSA, transactions costs are high, factor markets 
(especially for inputs and credit) often fail and service provision is poor. Under these 
circumstances, reliance on SM transactions can trap smallholders in Schultz’s efficient but poor 
conundrum, and leave processors with insufficient and unreliable supplies of poor quality 
product (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
 
Contract Farming 
CF is referred to a system where a contractor purchases the harvests of independent and 
frequently provides credit inputs and technical advice to the producer (Warning and Key, 2002; 
Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Weatherspoon, Cacho and Christy, 2001; Baumann, 2000; Porter and 
Philips-Howard, 1997). Also called quasi integration, a standard farming contract regulates in 
advance the price15, production practices, and product quality and credit facility among others. 
Unlike SM trading, the agreed exchange is in promised goods and services rather than in already 
produced goods and services. Two approaches exist regarding this type of coordination. One is 
the British, by Barker (1972), where the CF is viewed as alternative of the VI, which is seen as 
ownership integration. And other American, by Allen (1972), in which CF is viewed as a variant 
of VI (Rehber, 1998). The British approach is the one to be considered here. 
Although it’s significance in dealing with market failure, to ease uncertainty on access to market 
and to sufficient raw material of acceptable quality, and at some extent to reduce price risk, it 
also slot in some potential limitations like contract enforcement cost can be very high due to 
opportunistic behaviour of the participants and weaknesses of the existing legal system and 
highly asymmetric bargaining situation where one or fewer buyers, often with monopsony 
power, determine the prevailing price. Examples of CF in Mozambique are predominantly found 
in the cotton and tobacco sub-sectors. These arrangements are best viewed in SSA, on one hand, 
as a response to widespread failure of input and credit markets and to poor or absent service 
provision. On the other hand, in addition to its potential limitations, to the need to ensure 
sufficient volume of purchases to reduce unit processing costs, and concerns about product 
quality16 often significantly affect the structure of these relationships (Benfica, Tschirley and 
Sambo, 2002). 
 
15 Prices can be set as following: (government) administered prices, (processors or growers) fixed price, free bargaining system (which varies 
from flexible prices, calculated on SM values, on a consignment basis to split prices) and revenue sharing system, adapted from Eaton and 
Shepherd (2001) and Baumann (2000). See appendix A.7, for more details. 
16 Product quality concerns tend to become relatively more important determinants of the structure of these relationships in more developed 
market systems, where input and credit market failure may be less of an issue. 
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Vertical Integration 
This type of coordination, also known as ownership integration and plantation agriculture, refers 
to the situation when each individual farm loses its identity and becomes a company-owned 
farm, which owns or leases the land, buildings and equipment and has its own employees 
(Rehber, 1998). Here two or more separable stages of production or marketing are combined 
under common ownership and management. Integration can be complete (encompassing all 
vertical transactions in the sub sector), or partial if it involves at least some sales (or purchases) 
of the intermediate products to (or from) outside agents, according to Jaffee and Morton (1995) 
(Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). Plantation agriculture, being the second predominant17 
type of coordination in the Mozambican context, accounts in agro-industries involved in the 
processing of crops and has concessions of land for direct production of the crops. Examples of 
this type include the sugar, tea, coconut, rice and citrus sub-sectors. 
Williamson (1979) and Coase (1973) say that logistical and informational costs associated with 
the procurement of raw materials and the sale of outputs is saved under this coordination system. 
It also allows, by internalizing flows of intermediate inputs, the easing of certain risks associated 
with variability of suppliers and quality. Additionally, like CF, VI can be an effective response to 
market failure, particularly in early stages of market development. Looking at its weaknesses, 
they are related to social as well as private costs. The social costs are related to the reduced tax 
revenue and market concentration18. Private costs come in when cases like for example scale 
incompatibility of adjacent stages of production or trade are likely to have higher costs to the 
integrated systems than to the non-integrated ones (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
 
Farmer cooperatives 
Rehber (1984) defined an agricultural cooperative is an organization usually incorporated, 
owned and controlled by agricultural producers, which operates for the mutual benefit of its 
members as producers or patrons (Rehber, 1998). This type of coordination is also known as 
community integration or rural associations and cooperatives. In general, associations can be 
formed by farmers, processors, wholesalers, retailers or exporters, in order to undertake joint 
investments, common practices, or collective self-regulation of competition. Holloway, 
Nicholson, Delgado, Staal and Ehui (2000), Candler and Kumar (1998) and Jaffee and Morton 
 
17 For characterization of Mozambican agro-industry see appendix A.2. 
18 The different treatment given to the transactions realized within the firm, relatively to the ones realized with market, by the government, gives 
the firms space to evade or at least minimize the effects of taxes and market controls. 
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(1995), acknowledged that the FC result as means to overcome liquidity constraints, information 
asymmetries, and minimum scales of production or marketing that can hinder smallholder 
participation in rapidly growing sub-sectors (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). The agents in 
the group agree to act together in order to maximize their joint and individual interests. Any 
profits from processing are more likely to be spent or reinvested locally, rather than expatriated 
or spent on non-local tradable, strengthening the consumption linkages, multiplier effects, and 
potential poverty alleviation. 
Jaffee and Morton (1995) recognized that this type of agreement supports commodity system 
investment and coordination because it can i) Counter the problem of lumpy investments in 
marketing infrastructure and services; ii) Serve to internalize certain externalities and allow for 
private provision of certain public goods such as market information and extension services; iii) 
Reduce or pool member risks by guaranteeing commodity purchases and sales on behalf of 
members and by providing insurance and/or credit to members; iv) Lower transaction costs for 
members and non-members trading with members; and v) Exercise or counter market power for 
its members through collective negotiation with suppliers or buyers, by controlling member 
supply into the market and by informing members about prevailing terms of trade (Benfica, 
Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
It also has some drawbacks, like the free rider19problem, by both outsiders and members (by 
taking actions that yield them benefits above their proper share or reduce their contribution to 
group costs). Another drawback is related to the size of the association, which is important 
determining the size of the costs and benefits. Small groups implies large share of the benefits 
and substantial contribution to the costs among members, which promotes the commitment and 
gives higher bargaining power. But it also implies high covariant risks, limiting the potential for 
cooperative insurance and credit supply. Large groups, on the other hand, are associated with 
economies of scale, and greater scope for pooling and spreading of risks. However, asymmetric 
information will prevail turning difficult to monitor behaviour and detect free-riding by and 
among members (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
At present in Mozambique there is a concerted effort toward sustainable rural development 
initiatives among voluntarily established groups of households. These efforts, involve the 
identification by NGOs of opportunities for the development of small to medium scale agro-
processing firms with potential for increasing agricultural productivity while promoting the 
emergence of sustainable community-led agro-businesses in the medium to long run. The NGO 
contributes in: i) Aiding the organization and formalization, as sustainable businesses, of the 
 
19 The free rider problem refers to a situation where an individual receives the benefits of a public good or a positive externality without 
contributing to the production or bearing the costs of producing those benefits. 
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farmers associations; ii) Introduce and supply facilitation, some units, of a viable processing 
technology to the community; iii) Supplying seeds and promoting seed multiplication initiatives, 
and providing technical assistance through an extension network within the communities; and iv) 
Facilitating market linkages, both backward and forward, for the established associations. An 
effort in linking producer associations with large-scale processors in CF scope is also targeted, in 
the sunflower, sesame, maize, cashew and cassava and other tubes sub-sectors (Benfica, 
Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
 
3.2. Contract Farming 
Contracts in a general and incomplete sense are found in agriculture everywhere in extremely 
heterogeneous forms. Simple market specification contracts or future purchase agreements 
(typically determining price, quantity and time of delivery) are common and labour contracting, 
supplying labour and machinery have a wide application in agriculture (Wright, 1989). CF or 
contract production, however, must be distinguished from the multiplicity of simple marketing or 
labour contracts. Specifically CF entails relations between growers and private or public 
enterprise that substitute for SM transactions between family farms and a processing, export or 
purchasing unit. A standard farming contract regulates in advance price, production practices, 
product quality and credit facilities, etc (Coulter, et al., 2000; Rehber, 1998). 
Of course CF is not a panacea to solve all related problems of agricultural production and 
marketing systems. But it could be evaluated as a form of structural convergence between First 
and Third World agriculture and also as a way of achieving a higher synthesis between 
agriculture and industry. In the Clapp, Little and Watts (1994) view, CF is offered as a vehicle 
for the transfer of technology, modernization of peasant smallholders, and the creation of a stable 
and politically conservative class of family farmers. Overall, CF has spread enough that it can be 
considered a significant road of capitalist development in agriculture (Rehber, 1998). CF 
represents an expanding and much suggested method of agro-industrial integration for 
developing economies. CF is depicted as a method by which agriculture in the developing world 
is converging with that in the developed world (Watts, 1992).  
In order to explore CF, this section will discuss the historical view of the CF, the reasons behind 
the popularity of CF, which structure is suggested by the literature and experiences so far 
reported in terms of evaluation, impact and other studies of CF. 
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3.2.1. Historical perspective and conceptualization 
CF, as an institution in agriculture, has a long history. According to Watts (1994), this sort of 
coordination date since contracts were employed by the Japanese colonial state for sugar 
production in Taiwan in the period after 1885 and by the USA banana companies in Central 
America in the early part of the twentieth century. By the late twentieth century, however, across 
much of Western Europe (according to Barker (1972), the earliest record of forward purchase 
agreement is dated 1878), North America and Japan, CF became an integral part of the food and 
fibre industry. In advanced capitalist states, it seems that CF was widely used by the fruit and 
vegetable canning industry, besides the colonial Africa, in North America and by the seed 
industry in Western Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. In the recent three decades, as said by Ghee 
and Dorall (1992) and Glover (1994), CF is viewed as the promising institutional innovation to 
improve agricultural performance in LDCs, and as a key element of rural development20 and/or 
settlement projects, ensuring the self sustained development, through price incentives delivery, 
technology and other agricultural inputs (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Weatherspoon, Cacho and 
Christy, 2001; Key and Runsten, 1999; Rehber, 1998). CF is now a common organizational 
structure in many countries. 
Many definitions can be found for CF. The one classic definition provided by Roy (1963) refers 
to contractual arrangement between farmers and other firms, whether oral or written, specifying 
one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of an agricultural product. Glover (1984) 
suggests, in Roy’s definition, as excluding a marketing arrangement such as forward contracts, 
two conditions must be added. First, contracts should be non-transferable and second that the 
term “and/or” should be replaced by “and”, which means the contract must specify one or more 
conditions of production and marketing (Rehber, 1998). Specifically farmer’s contracted to grow 
crops for a central processing or export unit, and he provides land, labour and tools, and is 
supplied with inputs - fertilizer, seeds, and insecticides on credit – and often extension services 
also (Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). 
According to Glover (1992) worldwide applications in practice have caused to appear different 
terms and connotations regarding CF in the related literature, making it difficult to say whether 
CF is used only for a private sector scheme, where the aims and the structure of it are almost 
similar and rather definite, while some other terms are used for different applications or not. 
Those connotations are as follows (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Baumann, 2000; Rehber, 1998)21: 
 
20 Rural development is considered helping rural people set the priorities in their own communities through effective and democratic bodies, by 
providing the local capacity; investment in basic infrastructure and social services. Justice, equity and security; dealing with the injustices of the 
past and ensuring safety and security of the rural population, especially that of women, In _______ (1997). 
21 See on the appendix A8, the adapted characteristics table from Eaton and Shepherd (2001). 
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i) Outgrower Scheme: also connoted as centralized model, is developed generally as 
government scheme. The government usually has a public enterprise purchasing produce 
from farmers on its own or as part of a joint venture with a private firm. It is characterized 
by having a hybrid structure and multiple objectives. This term is frequently used in 
Africa and Asia. 
ii) Nucleus-Outgrower Scheme: This is a variation of the Outgrower scheme in which there 
is a project authority which has or administers a plantation adjacent to the processing 
plant. This plant supplements its own plantation production by contracting in different 
proportions. 
iii) Multipartite or Satellite Farming: This is also used in referring to any of the variations of 
the schemes mentioned above. The term multipartite arrangement is used to emphasize the 
scheme in which several organizations such as private firms, government and foreign aid 
agencies are involved. 
iv) Informal developers: involves informal production contract, normally seasonal, by small 
companies or individual entrepreneurs. It involves greater risk of extra-contractual 
marketing. 
v) Intermediary scheme: the term intermediary comes from the action of the integrator 
subcontracting linkages with farmers to intermediaries. Integrator usually is from the 
private sector. 
Several types of contracts are distinguished according to the number of decisions influenced, 
sharing of the risks and specifying contract terms. From the production decision or management 
point of view, two types of contracts are determined (Rehber, 1998). 
i) Limited Management Contracts: In this type, the farmer signs a contract to beneficiate 
from production inputs. There is not any real guarantee for the price. The farmer’s 
responsibility is limited only for the production inputs which he has gotten under 
agreement. 
ii) Full Management Contracts: In this case the farmer and the integrator firm have made a 
contract based on a certain amount of production.  In this type of contract the farmer has to 
follow some provisions specified in the agreement.  In this way, the producer provides a 
certain market for his product and insures himself against risks. 
Also worth to mention are the classification made by Kohls and Uhl (1985), which constitutes 
three broad categories (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Baumann, 2000; Rehber, 1998): 
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i) Market Specification Contracts: Both, grower and integrator agree to terms and 
conditions22 for the future sale and purchase of a crop or livestock product, at planting 
time. Little or none of the farmer’s management decisions are transferred. From the 
producer viewpoint, they guarantee a buyer if the specifications are met. 
ii) Resource Providing Contracts: In conjunction with the marketing arrangements, the 
integrator provides production resources with certain conditions, technical and managerial 
advice and supervision. Product prices are usually based upon the SM and income 
guarantees to the producers are minimal. 
iii) Management and Income Guaranteeing Contracts: The grower agrees to follow 
recommended production, inputs, cultivation and harvesting and marketing stipulations of 
the integrator. Market and price risks are transferred from farmers to integrators in this 
type. The integrator takes a substantial part of the managerial responsibility of the farmers. 
Considering all mentioned above about CF, a fair contract should contain reciprocal obligations 
with a balance between the rewards and the risks accruing to each party. A production contract 
should at least contain the following provisions: i) Define the parties; ii) Type and quality 
specification of the produce; iii) State the quantity of the produce23; iv) Specification of the 
responsibilities of both parties concerning production and marketing practices; v) Indicate the 
manner, including timing, of delivery or collection; vi) Determine the price24 (specific or 
formula) or other consideration and indicate the effects of variations in quality, quantity or 
manner of delivery and also specify the manner and timing of payment; vii) Specify the duration 
of the contract and the way in which it may be terminated and/or renewed; and viii) Appoint an 
arbitrator or otherwise specify how disputes are to be resolved (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; 
Rehber, 1998). 
 
3.2.2. Reasons for Contract Farming 
The open market transaction form of organization and price determination would remain the 
appropriate way of coordinating the links in the system if some conditions could occur such as: i) 
Production closer to the consumption points; ii) Control over short-term variation in prices and 
sale volumes either through government or producer organizations; iii) Grading standard setting, 
 
22 It includes product quality measures and quantities which will be acceptable to the integrator and also some regulations on the price and the 
method of payment 
23 Contracts could be signed on acreage or tonnage basis. Processors bear the yield risk if the contract is signed on an acreage basis, otherwise the 
farmers bear the yield risk 
24 According to Buccola and French (1981), price is frequently a variable left in contracts. Fixed or negotiated prices are used in contracts. 
Sometimes contract prices are established by a scale or formula that relates the contract price to various economic indicators, In Rehber (1998). 
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by the producer group, follow the markets requirements25; iv) Agricultural extension and 
advisory services which are running as government functions are sound and effective; and v) the 
hidden hand of the pricing, which controls the market mechanism (Rehber, 1998). But, all those 
conditions of the system are not likely to be satisfied simultaneously, i.e., its subject to market 
failures It could be changed to a more controllable decision-making mechanism by the private 
sector via group action such as FC, VI or CF. Additionally, recent sophisticated ideas such as 
environmentally sound, sustainable and economically viable agriculture are the propellers behind 
the fast growth of contractual arrangements (Rehber, 1998). 
The motivation driving the coordination of CF type, mentioned by Harryman (1994), Buccola 
and French (1981) and Roy (1963), is aspiration of securing the quality and quantities of 
commodities exchanged and to reduce the economic terms of trade. Moore (1994) added that CF, 
viewed as way of commercialization and industrialization in agriculture, will help the small 
family farms and farm labourers who need capital and managerial assistance. Harryman (1994) 
and Roy (1963) point that CF is also attractive, from the industry view point, due to the ability to 
guarantee a steady flow of raw material, unlikely to happen in open market purchases, in order to 
sustain stable unit costs. They and Rehber (1998) as well, added that CF is seen as a sound way 
to push technological innovation, improving producer management skills and providing more 
efficient production processes, keeping pace with the rapidly improving production technologies. 
Another main important force behind CF is changes in the market structure26 which need to be 
paced (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Rehber, 1998). 
By utilizing Outgrower rather than engaging in direct production themselves, companies reduce 
their costs while maintaining control over production. Evidence from North Pondoland sugar 
scheme in South African former Transkei (Eastern Cape) shows that there are – not surprisingly 
– plans to disband more of the core estate to outgrowing. This process may be accelerated by the 
labor disputes. Another important advantage of CF to be considered, described by Goldsmith 
(1985) and Glover and Kusterer (1990) is the potential dangers of union intervention for the 
companies (Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). Along with a variety of related problems such as 
delays in delivery or payment, quality deterioration, etc., which are emerging from the 
applications, CF generally also has some disadvantages or problems as a production system. 
Although one of the economic factors favouring the increasing use of production contracts is the 
need to realize efficiencies through risk management, CF creates its own risk, despite reducing 
others, varying according to the physical, social and market environments (Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001; Rehber, 1998): 
 
25 Assuming that the market requirements, in terms of quality and quantity, meet the standards required by the purchaser. 
26 Market structure involves quality requirements, quantity requirements and market share, among many others. 
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i) As Kelley (1994) affirmed, for the producer, the failure to produce on contract standards 
will result in loss of the contract’s premium prices. Other risks include the non-renewal or 
termination of contracts, perhaps for non-economic reasons. For the processor, the main 
risks are the failure to line up supply, or losing timely reception of desired quality and 
quantity of product, loss of technological advantage, and liability to the producers and to 
third parties. 
ii) The farmer loses his independence to some extent varying with the contract conditions. 
That means the farmer’s management function is transferred to another person. It is 
arguable that a skilled farmer may worsen his circumstances under a contract compared to 
taking his chance in an open market. 
iii) It is a fact that contracting is a negotiation between unequal, economically powerful agri-
business and rather weaker farmers. But farmers can cooperate to gain bargaining power 
to ensure fair contract terms. As said by Ling and Liebrand (1995), by working together in 
their cooperatives, farmer-members can better control their own economic destiny. 
iv) If the integrator has gained a monopsony position, he could abuse his own position to 
violate contract provisions on his favour. That means when alternative marketing 
opportunities are closed out, an overly integrated firm or sector may beat down the terms 
of the contract, which isn’t a desirable consequence for improving agricultural marketing. 
The controversial nature of CF schemes in Africa (and elsewhere) has been emphasized also by 
Carney and Watts (1990) and Watts (1994), who points to the widespread manipulation of 
contracts by large companies and the growing household tensions generated by this externally 
induced change. They also regard the basis of peasant contracting as essentially self-exploitation, 
since farmers are forced to labour more intensively (longer hours) and more extensively through 
the use of child labour. In addition, Little (1994) argues that CF is exploitative when it involves a 
highly unequal power relationship so that contract farmers are relegated to the status of hired 
hands. Furthermore, Watts, Little, Billings and Jaffee (1988) accept that net farmer incomes are 
generally increased by participation in contracting schemes though equity is reduced. In similar 
vein, Clapp (1994) refers to CF as a form of giving the farmer an illusory, though formal or 
legal, title to land and labour (Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). 
Government intervention and subsidization policy could be seen as an alternative to CF. 
However, in the developing countries public interventions and support policies are ineffective 
and do not help to remove the obstacles mentioned above. Government efforts to subsidize are 
also mostly in favour of large farmers. At this point the New World Order of global restructuring 
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of the food industry symbolized by World Trade Organization (WTO), which are mainly aiming 
at lessening or cutting agricultural subsidies, must be taken into account (Rehber, 1998). 
Rehber (1996) pointed out that the majority of farms are small and subsistent and that they are 
potentially an important source of growth in agricultural production and small scaled agriculture 
has some socio-economic advantages. But, serious constraints on small farm production exist, 
related to problems of access to production inputs and services (factor and product market 
failures), and information (information market failure). Small farmers often lack the necessary 
production and marketing information particularly about the new crops and varieties. Even with 
sufficient information they do not have enough financial resources and also the credit facilities 
are limited mainly because of lack of collateral (credit and insurance market failure). CF is an 
example of a institution that deals with many of these constraints in an integrated manner 
(Coulter, et al., 2000; Key and Runsten, 1999; Rehber, 1998). 
Apart from these economic reasons there are several political reasons why CF is attractive to 
private companies. It allows the company not to invest too many resources in a country and 
therefore to avoid the risk of appropriation. CF, presented as a smallholder friendly scheme, can 
be good for the public image of a company and give the impression that it is progressive. This 
can be exploited by the company to encourage the Government, or even international aid 
agencies to provide credit for operating capital or for the rehabilitation of plantations (Baumann, 
2000). 
 
CF as a Response to Credit Market Failures 
Non-traditional crops – like tobacco – purchased by agro-industrial processors are generally 
much more costly to produce per unit of land than traditional crops, and most growers require 
credit to finance their production. Hence the structure of the credit market and access to credit 
are important in CF. Agro-industrial processors are often well suited to provide loans to growers. 
Unlike the formal lending institutions, e.g. banks, agro-industrial processors can monitor and 
enforce contracts and do have lower default costs than banks. Processors can extract a grower’s 
debt directly from the crop revenue before the grower receives his payment (Key and Runsten, 
1999). 
Often, growers have thin alternative markets and will be forced to sell to the firm. Unlike banks, 
processors can be assured that the credit is spent on production because the loans are usually 
given in kind and the firms often monitor the use of inputs. Low monitoring, enforcement and 
other transaction costs place firms in a position to compete favourably with formal and informal 
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lenders. In some cases firms get raw products from the farmers at below market prices in 
exchange for credit, thus presenting a big incentive for firms to contract than use the SM. To the 
extent that smaller, poorer farmers are willing to pay more for credit, firms will have an 
incentive to contract with them (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
 
CF as a Response to Insurance Market Failures 
Non-traditional crops tend to be riskier in terms of income than traditional crops. This stems 
from the associated higher market risks for non-traditional crops. Hence the insurance market is 
also important in CF. Yields tend to be more variable because of higher susceptibility of non-
traditional crops to pest and climatologically related hazards. As a result prices tend to fluctuate 
a lot due to variability in supply. Frequently in developing countries, and especially for lower 
income producers, formal institutional strategies for smoothing consumption – crop insurance, 
formal credit markets, or commodity futures markets – are unavailable or have high associated 
transaction costs (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
CF – as a response to insurance market failures – is in position to insure growers against price 
and yield fluctuations. Firms are able to diversify their production sources geographically, have 
access to inexpensive financial resources with which to smoother fluctuations in profit and with 
participation in production process allow them to provide insurance with low transaction costs 
and can avoid some of the moral hazard problems associated with crop insurance27. Thus 
imperfect insurance market provides an incentive for firms to contract or vertically integrate 
rather than use SM (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
 
CF as a Response to Information Market Failures 
Missing markets for information can slow adjustments on the part of growers and result in costly 
crop supply and quality shortfalls for firms that rely on SM for their product supply. With perfect 
information prices for products and factors should send signals about supply and demand, but 
prices may not efficiently transfer complex and rapidly changing information. Yet efficient 
production requires growers to have information about the optimal cultivation techniques and 
information about the needs of firms. On the other hand if firms were to contract labour they 
would need to supervise the work done. Models of labour supervision claim that hired workers 
offer an amount of effort that is a function of the amount of supervision applied (Key and 
 
27 For the firms, according to Mosely, P. and Krishnamurthy, R. in Mishra, P.K. (1996: 271), the insurance against the risks are categorized in 
four main types: i) “act of God”; ii) Destruction of specified assets; iii) Loan default; and iv) Production and income loss. In Eaton and Shepherd 
(2001: 79). 
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Runsten, 1999). In such an environment, VI that relies heavily on supervision to motivate labour 
will be relatively less efficient than cultivation by self-supervised farmers, ceteris paribus. 
Firms can cope with missing markets for information, and efficiently communicate product and 
technology information to growers. Where production is information intensive and farmers lack 
resources to acquire the information, contracts can specify use of firm employed extension 
agents who both communicate the firm’s needs, technical information and monitor the behaviour 
of growers. Large farmers have an advantage over small farmers with information gathering 
because of the fixed-cost nature of information acquiring. As a result small farmers are better off 
contracting, as a response to missing market for information, and because of high costs of 
supervision and moral hazard problems, firms are better off contracting farmers as well (Key and 
Runsten, 1999). 
 
CF as a Response to Factor Market Failures 
When markets for factors controlled by the household, such as family labour, land, management 
skills, or animal power – are missing or imperfect, growers will attempt to compensate by 
trading in the markets that do exist. Households with larger endowments of family labour will 
attempt to compensate for market failures in labour by renting in more land, or by producing 
more labour intensive crops. The land market is also riddled with imperfections especially in 
rural Africa. Firms have an incentive to contract with household with under-utilised resources 
such as family labour or land. For labour intensive crops – tobacco being one of them – firms 
have an incentive to contract with households with small land endowments and large families. 
Thus CF allows households that would otherwise under-utilise their resources to respond 
positively to the market imperfections in the factor markets (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
 
CF as a Response to Product Market Failures 
The agro-processing firms normally trade in crops for which there is a thin or missing local 
market, for example, cotton and tobacco in Mozambique. In order for the firm to meet its supply 
needs, they have to contract, if they cannot produce themselves. This creates a market for the 
product that would not have been traded locally. Given the underdeveloped product markets, 
firms may not be able to obtain sufficient quantities or timely delivery for their processing needs. 
Thus missing product market gives a firm an incentive to contract regardless of the scale of 
operation of the farmer (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
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3.2.3. Structure of Contract Farming 
It is not easy to point out a standardized form for these coordination schemes due to the great 
variety, with their hybrid structure and multiple objectives that have been used in developing 
world. A simplified model, resulted from merging the models presented by Rehber (1998) and 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) is discussed here for a standard (private company scheme) contract 
production form to have a fair and successful implementation of CF for both the agricultural 
sector and economy as whole (Figure 3.1). At first look it is obvious that both sides need each 
other in order to strike a bargain in the contractual relationship, which operates for their mutual 
benefits. Both should look at each other as partners who are working for them rather than rivals 
otherwise, this cooperation would be always a source of dispute and dissatisfaction. Therefore, 
as shown by the Figure 3.1, both should gather as requirements collaboration consciousness and 
additionally to that it is important to have established beforehand reputations for honesty and fair 
dealing. 
On the grower’s side, it’s important for them to act in an organized manner, considering that the 
history of agricultural producers demonstrates that they have been seldom rewarded 
appropriately in the market place due to their weak market power relatively to other participants 
in the food industry. Recognition gained by organized groups is better as opposed to the lack of 
recognition accorded to unorganized farm producers (Anderson, 1994). And, as said by Scheid 
(1991) and Moore (1994), organizing a bargaining cooperative among farmers makes them 
rather powerful in a contracted relationship. Such an organization also could collaborate with 
processors, in negotiating regulations on imports and in other aspects, such as market 
development, political action, making adjustments to consumer demand, etc (Rehber, 1998). 
Those bargaining organizations between growers and processors are to be organized on the 
national level. But in practice, the level of negotiation is an arguable problem. It could be said 
that, in general, the collaboration and negotiation between them might be better carried out in a 
decentralized way, at the firm basis. A nationwide farmer and food industry organization could 
act as an administrative organism, arbitrate and guaranteeing the application of private 
agreements. Experimentation and development of reference and agricultural techniques would 
probably remain the responsibility of the central body. According to Valceschini (1995), 
experience in France has shown that, between 1961 and 1990, a considerable shift had emerged 
to decentralize the contracted economy from the national level negotiations which are having 
difficulty reconciling industrial and marketing coordination (Rehber, 1998). 
 Coordination consciousness. 
Division  of agricultural 
production or growers’ 
relations: Planning; 
Extension; legal issues; etc. 
Processors’ organization. 
Coordination consciousness. 
Farmers’ organization 
(cooperative): Extension 
and training; legal issues; 
etc. 
Figure 3.1 Structure of Contract Farming 
Source: adapted from Eaton and Shepherd (2001) and Erkan Rehber (1998). 
On the integrators side, in addition to the collaboration organizations with the growers and the 
shortcomings of that link, mentioned in the previous paragraph, they are the ones deciding on the 
most of the production and marketing practices and measures, therefore their activities efficiency 
directly affect the efficiency of CF. The first step in successful implementation is the 
organization of a sound organizational body. Contracts could vary from company to company, 
but all of them must have a special unit which is dealing with all contractual issues and is 
endowed with necessary persons and equipment. And its relationship to the other functions of the 
firm must be determined clearly (Brown and Deloitte&Touche, 1994). All these must be inserted 
in a sound socio-economic and legislative environment, which are on the governments hands to 
promote. 
The governments’ role is crucial in promoting a successful application. The first function might 
be legislative arrangements. In agriculture, with a tremendous variety of the production 
 − 34 −
 − 35 −
                                                
enterprises, it is not possible to put out comprehensive contract models which have strict rules. 
Instead, government could determine a framework for a contract and enact some regulations to 
solve disputes and take part in arbitration to some extent. Besides this direct role of the 
government in contractual mechanisms, agricultural support and intervention policies which 
aimed, in general, to improve CF could be rather effective and functional. For instance, in the 
European Union (EU), according to the Regulation Commission, the production aid system is 
based on contracts between producers and processors and the particulars to be included in the 
contracts for the purposes of the aid system should be specified (by Anonymous 1984 in Rehber, 
1998). 
Tax policy is another aspect that must be considered to promote CF. CF is a way of recording 
systems of production, which creates a situation of reluctance to get on arrangements fearing 
more taxes. Thus adopting a tax policy which facilitates and remedies that situation could be 
recommended. Additionally agricultural crop insurance policy could be a considerable way to 
promote insurance against the risk28 faced by farmers and, indirectly by firms. Turning to 
extension and training policies of the government, the CF has the potential to improve their 
functionality. Another point, which is the base of the discussion in this study, is that credit 
policies in agriculture also could be realized by contractual arrangements, especially by CF, that 
consider the contract itself as collateral. 
As said above, the level of negotiation and cooperation is an arguable problem. Therefore an 
involvement of an independent organization to resolve disputes and disagreements29 between 
firms and farmers, which are the major causes for failure in CF, might be a good idea, 
considering that going through the court systems creates long delays. Thus, according to Spolter 
(1992), arbitration and/or a conciliation system would be useful, by involving government and 
non-governmental organizations’ representatives (Rehber, 1998). In arbitration, an arbitrator 
renders a decision and a third party imposes it, taking all the control away from the parties. But 
in a conciliation or mediation process, the parties retain control of the process and the outcome.  
 
3.2.4. Success and failure determinants 
When evaluating success and failure of CF applications and their outcomes and its different 
origins have to be taken into account. According to Watts (1994), on one side, in developed and 
developing countries, CF in one way, is seen to some extent as provider of a steady flow of the 
raw material to the marketing or processing industry with certain quality standards. This view is 
 
28 Specialization in production through contract farming might increase the profitability level, but it also involves higher risk for the farmers. 
29 This disputes and disagreements can be over quality standards, delays in delivery and payments and default on loans and others in the same 
framework. 
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also shared by Porter and Philips-Howard (1997). On the other side, in the less-developed world, 
it was initiated by complementing, occasionally competing with and partially replacing 
plantation and estate agriculture or by subsuming independent farmers and sometimes newly 
settled families under public or private auspices to produce a variety of products for domestic 
consumption and export30 (Rehber, 1998). 
In addition to individual project case studies there have been two important cross-country 
reviews. The first, co-directed by Michael Watts and Peter Little, specifically Watts, Little, 
Billings and Jaffee in 1988, and Little and Watts in 1994, incorporates field research in seven 
countries in East, West and Southern Africa. The second, by David Glover in 1989 and 1990, 
brings together research on 18 schemes in seven eastern and southern African countries. Both 
these studies and a number of individual project studies attempt to identify conditions under 
which CF can benefit rural economies and populations, though Glover is more positive, overall, 
in his perceptions of CF arrangements than are Little and Watts (Porter and Philips-Howard, 
1997). 
The nature of the crops and the technology in use for their production are the most crucial 
determinants of the success and failure of CF in practice. For instance basic grains that are not 
perishable and do not require strict quality or prompt harvesting and processing do not generally 
require contracts arrangements (Andrews, Hamilton and Looney, 1994). On the other hand, the 
perishable and bulkiness of some products requires concentrated production and careful 
scheduling and are generally subject to contractual relationships. For the commodities for which 
supplies of both inputs and outputs are inelastic and shifting, and cost is very high, such as 
broiler production, CF is rather successful (Rehber, 1998). The power interface between farmers 
and companies is another important determinant. It is particularly significant because 
exploitation in CF, as in other arenas, is ultimately based, above all, on an undefended and 
unequal distribution of property rights (Corbridge, 1993). 
Minot (1993) points out that CF, in terms of structure, has a great variety: the form it takes and 
the attitudes and background of the growers are affected mainly by the availability of other 
alternatives and the peculiarities of the political, economic, and social circumstances at the local 
and national levels, along with the specialization of the product. Therefore, evaluation of using 
CF as a way of increasing agricultural productivity, improving marketing and fostering rural 
developments cannot be assessed independently from those factors mentioned above (Rehber, 
1998). Then it can be said that the reasons behind success and failure of CF in developed, 
developing and less developed countries are so different depending on the related infrastructure. 
 
30 That explains how contractual relationships have been appearing as Outgrower schemes in developing and less developed countries while it 
was in the form of private ones mainly between an individual or a group of farmers and private companies in the developed world. 
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In the developed world, sophisticated market structure, high technology level, farming structure, 
and attitudes of the governments create a rather suitable environment for private contracting 
arrangements, which is increasing, depending on the product features. For instance, according to 
Kelley (1994), in U.S. agriculture from 1980 to 1990, the percentage of pigs produced under 
contract increased from 2% to 18%. In 1990 contract production accounted for 7% of food and 
feed grain production and 12% of cotton production. In the sectors where contract production 
began, more than 90% of broilers and 80% of processed vegetables are produced under 
contracts. The broiler industry in U.S., according to Vukina and Foster (1996), is almost entirely 
vertically coordinated as in almost all of the developed countries (Rehber, 1998). 
In the EU the production aid system has been encouraging CF. This approach, of course, has a 
considerable role in the development of CF in the Union. For instance, Erkan, Akdemir and Koç 
(1993) have noticed an increase of the contractual arrangements in the Spanish food industry 
after joining the EU. In Spain the number of farmers involved in CF reached 77,000 in 1988 
while it was only 28,000 in 1986. Zurek (1993) have reported that in German agriculture, CF and 
VI approaches can result in substantial advantages for cooperating farmers but do not 
automatically improve the competitive position of the parties involved. Grosskopf (1994) stated 
that in Germany, VI through contract production is already common in dairy, poultry and sugar 
sectors accounting for around 38% of agricultural production. Outside these sectors, however, 
only about 6% of output is produced under contract (Rehber, 1998). 
CF is a continually evolving process and agricultural development is linked to overall 
development and affects the forms that CF takes in different area. This was salient in a study 
based on the data of the Agricultural Census of Italy, which shows that contract arrangements are 
closely associated with farming in the entire region and reflect the state and conditions of 
agricultural development in each of them (Pecci and Lipparini, 1993). In the improved feed 
sector, the spread of CF has accelerated a narrowing of the genetic base of Western agriculture 
which has accompanied the development and widespread use of new crop varieties (Burch and 
Rickson, 1990). Biotechnology companies are also expected to develop VI by responding to 
speciality markets and involvement in CF (Shimoda, 1994). 
In the developing world available infrastructure needs intensive government involvement and 
also the financial support of domestic and foreign donor agencies and initiatives of national and 
multinational companies. In the recent two decades there has been a tendency for trans-national 
corporations to shift from land ownership to a contracting system. This system of coordination 
holds great potential for rural development if it can be integrated easily into the national 
economy. In such a structure, agricultural policies which are shaped by public institutions both at 
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the level of national governments and international organizations are shrinking in importance 
and are in the process of being replaced by unregulated, trans-national market forces (Nanda, 
1995). Glover (1983) foresees that there is a possibility of exploitation as an unorganized mass 
of smallholders faces a single buyer. Political as well as economic factors are thus of crucial 
importance in determining the distribution of benefits resulting from CF (Rehber, 1998). 
Latin America was not spared by this spreading of CF schemes. In Honduras, for example, 
bananas once cultivated on corporate plantations, are now grown by associate producers under 
contract. In Peru breweries that once bought barley on the world market are now supplied by 
contracts with a network of farmers. A study based on the experience of seven countries in East 
and South East Africa with CF and Outgrower schemes in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, by Glover (1990), shows that in most cases, performance in 
delivering services and providing income increases to farmers has been quite good, although 
high management costs limit the extent to which this form of organization could be more widely 
applied. It was concluded that looser control and relying more on price incentives and farmer 
participation might lower overhead costs while developing management capacity among growers 
(Rehber, 1998). 
The Kenyan experience has shown that CF has the potential to provide a Pareto-improving form 
of governance, and it can be used to increase the income available to the rural sector. It is a 
practice which may be engaged in for both efficiency and anticompetitive motives (Gross, 1994). 
Also in Kenya CF has, within smallholder tea production, changed family member relations and 
the role and stature of women and men in the family (Bulow and Sorensen, 1988). In Swaziland, 
the Fourth National Development Plan advocates the development of Outgrower schemes based 
on the example of Vuvulane Irrigated Farms as an alternative strategy for rural development 
(Levin, 1988). With reference to tobacco production in Sri Lanka, it is argued that CF can only 
contribute to meeting basic needs, if the income and employment it generates can be distributed 
with a measure of efficiency (Kirk, 1987). 
In both Nigeria and South Africa was found that appropriate scheme staffing and a degree of 
decentralization in management structures to be a particularly critical element in forging good 
farmer-company relations for contract schemes are to work well: it is important not only that 
company do not cheat their small growers, but also that farmers are confident that they do not 
cheat (Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). Moreover, communication between company and 
farmers, and consultation with farmers, is vital if perpetuation of top-down approaches - so often 
a major cause of failure on schemes - is to be avoided (Maloa and Nkosi, 1993). This cannot be 
achieved without the appointment of well trained liaison and extension officers, who speak local 
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languages, possess appropriate interpersonal skills and are preferably local indigenas (Porter and 
Philips-Howard, 1997). 
It is clear that that small farmer who maintain alternative opportunities for production and 
income, in addition to their contracted obligations to the company, are in a much stronger 
position than those whose land area is devoted entirely to the contract crop, which have little 
opportunity to secure another income in case the company attempts to secure an agreement 
disadvantageous to the farmer, or where market prices suddenly collapse. Glover and Kusterer 
(1990) observed that the existence of alternatives is an important precondition for a CF situation 
that benefits small farmers. They suggest that companies may shelter producers from risk in the 
first few years of production, so that by the time the company starts to squeeze the growers they 
have committed a large portion of their resources to the crop. However, they also present 
evidence from outside Africa (Guatemalan vegetable production) that farmers may invest profits 
from the early phase when profits are high to diversify production so that they become less 
dependent on a single crop or buyer (Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). 
In the rapidly growing economies of Southern Asia, besides emergence of processing enterprises 
which meet the diversifying and growing domestic and international demand, CF systems are a 
feature of the rural growth process. A research study which was based on case studies of village 
level processing and marketing activities involving soybean, cassava and tobacco in Indonesia, 
by Kawagoe, von Broun and Kenedy (1994), illustrates that significant additional income and 
employment can accrue to farm producers from such agricultural marketing and processing 
activities at the village level (Rehber, 1998). India has become the second largest producer of 
fruit and vegetables in the world. When the facilities to improve this production potential are 
discussed, one of the measures suggested is CF (Bhatia, 1994). 
Experiences in the same region of the world have shown variations. For example, Glover and 
Ghee (1992) study showed that the Malaysian schemes appear to be the most successful. They 
are long established and increase in size and number. The Indonesian schemes are also 
widespread and active. But Thailand’s experience, according to Manarungsan and Suwangindar 
(1992) is quite the opposite. Attempts and efforts have failed in almost every case examined. 
Both farmers and firms enjoy greater flexibility, and more production, marketing and ensuring 
supply options if the farms are small and have diversified production activities. Of course, the 
failures in the related government policies also have negative impacts on CF. Perhaps the most 
important reason for the success of the Malaysian and Indonesian experiences, according to 
Ghee and Dorall (1992), is the strong and continuous support provided by government (Rehber, 
1998). 
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According to Rehber (1989), one of the important reasons behind the failure of CF is the 
availability of other ways of vertical coordination and open market facilities. This is clearly 
experienced in the Turkish hop industry. In the hop market, there are three marketing alternatives 
that farmers are faced with. One private company is trying to grow some amount of raw material 
in its own plantation along with contractual relationships with the farmers. Another private 
company and the public monopoly are in the market only at harvesting season as buyers with an 
advance-paid price system. There is also a farmers’ cooperative organization as a third 
alternative. In such a structure, despite the favourable offers, according to Rehber (1997), the 
private company could not succeed in increasing the number of the contracted farmers and its 
market share over 60% (Rehber, 1998). 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
If it is true that every theory must be based upon observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be 
observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts would be desultory 
and fruitless; we could not retain them: for the most part we could not even perceive them. 
— Auguste Comte (“The Positive Philosophy”, 1853) 
 
Questions of methodology are all about the validity, using the correct measures for the concepts 
being studied, and reliability, stability, accuracy and precision of measurement, of the data 
collected. Therefore, better understanding of methodological issues may encourage improved 
research practices by fostering consistency between the underlying assumptions, theories and 
knowledge production activities of management and organizational researchers. 
But it is also important to consider the fact that economics deals with the interrelations of human 
beings, and that the investigator is himself part of the subject matter being investigated in a more 
intimate sense than in the physical sciences, raises special difficulties in achieving objectivity at 
the same time that it provides the social scientist with a class of data not available to the physical 
scientist. 
In this chapter, the methodology adopted for this research is described, including a description of 
the research setting, data collection methods and analysis techniques. It is structured as follows. 
In section 4.1, personal motivation in the study is presented. In section 4.2, the research approach 
is discussed, including details about each approach used in the study. In section 4.3, data 
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collection sources and techniques used for data collection are described. It also includes details 
of the analysis process. 
 
4.1. Motivation 
Firstly, it’s important to commend all involved in this program, which is very a vital instrument 
for students who have the desire to study and impact and assist that development of their country 
but do not have access to the financial means to accomplish this. I came across the Environment 
and Development Economics Programme through Andrea Shindiapin, a member of the Eduardo 
Mondlane University (UEM), Maputo, while was writing the dissertation for Honours degree in 
Business Management, at the Faculty of Economics at UEM. Opportunities of this nature are 
uncommon for individuals at an early stage of their professional development.  
From August 2002 to June 2003, employed as a trainee economic consultant in a private 
consultancy company in Mozambique, achieved an unique opportunity to practically apply the 
skills acquired till that date in a broad range of projects, for example surveys on barriers to 
exportation in Mozambique, a cost evaluation of Maputo’s Central Hospital and a survey of the 
Mozambican business environment. Through this experience a great interest in development 
economics was cultivated and an intention to proceed with postgraduate studies and research on 
development economics, focussing on the area of finance, which reflects the interest area.  
The practical experience gained has served to reinforce the desire and intention to continue with 
postgraduate studies and has also improved the understanding of the significant role played by 
economists and managers in developing countries. As a student and an assistant teacher within 
the Faculty of Economics at UEM during the first semester of 2003, the main principle instructed 
and learned was one can never say I’ve learned enough, because economies are a dynamic 
system, being in a constant state of change. 
 
4.2. Research Approach 
In order to bring up the theoretical base of the contractual relationship and what so far have been 
written about it and empirical evidence, to back the theoretical aspects, the research approach 
was based on the following founding principles: i) A triangulation of positivism, post positivism 
and logical empiricism; ii) Econometrics; and iii) Case study method. These are now discussed. 
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4.2.1. Positivist, post positivist and logical empiricist approach 
Positivism is oriented to testing and confirmation of general theories which take the form of well 
validated propositions which specify relations, often causal, among well defined and 
quantitatively measured variables. It is effective for theory testing but it precludes theory 
development and discovery because positivist methods are inherently oriented to testing pre-
established hypotheses and propositions. Positivists seek rigor using statistical criteria and 
conceptions of reliability and validity to evaluate the quality of quantitative findings. Sample 
size, common methods bias and sampling error are common concerns (Gephart, 1999). 
The problem with the positivism is that the world might not be readily apprehended and that 
variable relations or facts might be only probabilistic, not deterministic, thus the positivist focus 
on experimental and quantitative methods used to test and verify hypotheses have been 
complemented to some extent by an interest in using qualitative methods to gather broader 
information outside of readily measured variables. This view is consistent with the post 
positivism, which also assumes that an objective world exists, being this way an evolution of the 
positivism (Gephart, 1999). 
The empirical work is also informed by logical empiricism, developed by Carnap (1936), a more 
moderate version of positivistic approach, which assumes, as the positivistic, an objective world 
and is concerned in disclosing truth and facts using experimental or survey methods, focusing on 
formal propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, hypotheses testing, and statistical 
generalizations from a sample where the phenomenon is studied to a larger population 
(Bharadwaj, 2000; Gephart, 1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). The only difference between 
the two of them is that instead of the verifiability criterion, the logical empiricism, uses a more 
liberal testability criterion, replacing the notion of verifiability with the notion of gradually 
increasing confirmation (Bharadwaj, 2000). 
This triangulated approach adopted drew upon both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection in order to fill the gaps of one another such that the reliability and validity should not 
be questioned. More specifically, the qualitative methods used in the study included semi-
structured informal interviews, informal meetings, and secondary data collection including of 
forms, manuals, reports and other individualities datasets. As for the quantitative methods, the 
following section specifically addresses it. 
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4.2.2. Econometric approach 
Positivism assumes an objective world which scientific methods can more or less readily 
represent and measure, and it seeks to predict and explain causal relations among key variables 
(Gephart, 1999). Here the role of Econometrics becomes important, since it is, at a broad level, 
the science and art of using economic theory and statistical techniques to analyze economic data 
(Stock and Watson, 2003). It helps in decision making process in economics, when it involves 
understanding relationships among variables in the world around us, just as in the case of this 
study. Here the decision problem is whether the CF scheme can be considered as an alternative, 
to the other credit sources, in the sense that can be used in coordination to overcoming its market 
failure problems. 
Specifically the econometric instruments to be used here are characterized as follows. In terms of 
the econometric model, the maximum likelihood Probit and Logit models are the ones mostly 
relied on to assess the type of decision problem stated. Probit regression is nonlinear regression 
model specifically designed for binary dependent variables. It uses the standard normal 
cumulative probability distribution function. Logit regression is, also as Probit, a nonlinear 
regression model specifically designed for binary dependent variables, with the difference of 
using the logistic cumulative probability distribution function (Stock and Watson, 2003). The 
previous one, Logit, is the one that will be used as the main econometric tool for the assessment 
of the main hypothesis. Additionally to this data validity, normality and heteroskedasticity will 
be assessed in order to guarantee data and hypothesis testing robustness.  
The use of probabilistic models is justified by the main idea to be tested, whether higher is the 
probability of the success of the CF’ credit scheme relatively to other sources. Moreover, the 
econometric approach allowed to determine the importance of the, across households under 
vertical coordination with the two companies, DIMMON and MLT, in four districts of Tete 
Province, the conditions of land ownership, inputs and utensils endowments, education, 
household income and other factors31. 
 
4.2.3. Case study approach 
Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions 
and their relationships. Robert K. Yin (1984) defines the case study research method as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
 
31 The whole variables list used can be seen in the Table B1, under the Appendix B. 
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the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used (Soy, 1996).  
The case study research method was opted to bring us to an understanding of a complex issue or 
CF’ credit scheme and extend the experience through explaining and building upon what so far is 
know about CF scheme. Additionally it was also used as a way to provide a basis to apply 
solutions to the situation of the credit constraint the smallholders face. The qualitative and 
quantitative nature of the data, in addition to the need to explore a wider range of variables that 
influence the structure and performance of the CF scheme, strengthen the case study method’s 
odds on being used. 
 
4.3. Research setting and fieldwork 
A major trend towards the role of the micro financial institutions has recently emerged in 
Mozambique. Additionally questions about what kind of approach toward the agricultural sector 
development is raised. Some argue the industrialization is the only way to boost the agricultural 
sector. Others say that efforts must be taken in order to increase the productivity ratios without 
entering into complicated technologies transfer to the smallholders. All sectors have been 
targeted by this movement. The credit sector was the not left outside, being the main clutch no 
matter what the outcome of the movement. 
The Principal-Agent (PA) model was the framework of all the study, under the game theory and 
informational asymmetries. The use of the model was motivated by the existence of a contractual 
relationship between the grower and the contractor, where both have right and obligations 
towards each other. Also the informational asymmetries, for example, of the grower not exerting 
the effort desired by the contractor or the contractor defaulting on the obligation of buying the 
grower’s product, motivated the use of the PA framework. 
 
4.3.1. Data collection 
Fieldwork was carried out during the period from January to March 2005. Data were collected 
through informal interviews and informal meetings with financial and agricultural sector 
personnel32. The personnel met ranged from economists, the head of some micro-financial 
institutions, of the agro-industrial programs (the DIMON – Tabacos de Tete and Mozambique 
Leaf Tobacco (MLT)), and researchers on the relevant area. The interviews or conversations 
 
32 Informal interviews were discussions carried out in unplanned and chance meetings with relevant personnel. Informal meetings were also 
unplanned discussions with a group of them. 
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were informal and semi-structured, due to the fact of being located in rural areas, near to the 
smallholders, and continuously working. In addition, several informal conversations and 
discussions also took place with senior staff at the administrative and operational levels. 
Data was also gathered through formal arrangement with the relevant institutions, namely BoM, 
DIMON, MLT and CPI. In the case of the BoM the data was at macro level, which allowed the 
sectored distribution of the credit and of the credit by finality (crops). As for the DIMON and 
MLT, being the target institutions, from quantitative to qualitative information was collected, as 
cross-sectional data about the household or smallholders under the CF scheme with this 
institution, from the MA33. 
The cross-sectional data consist of information on the smallholders’ characteristics, from their 
family members to their farming activity’ information, under vertical coordination with 
DIMMON and MLT companies in Tete province, specifically in Chifunde district for the first 
company, and Macanga, Angónia and Marávia districts for the second company. The data was a 
result of a survey conducted by the Gabinete de promoção do sector comercial agrícola (Cabinet 
for commercial agricultures’ promotion – GPSCA), working under the Department of Policy 
Analysis (DAP) of the Economics Directorate (DE) in the MA, to the family sector of the 
Zambezy Valley, specifically in Tete and Sofala provinces, related to the cotton and tobacco 
crops.  
That survey was conducted in two periods, firstly in March 2004 and secondly in August 2004. 
Although the data had limitations primarily because of the incomplete nature of the financial 
records of the smallholders, secondly to the limited number of crop coverage, and thirdly the 
consideration of only one province, Tete, for the assessment proposed, certain estimates were 
established in line with general accounting practices and the given information by the 
companies, also a yearly nationwide conducted survey by MA, called TIA (National agricultural 
survey) of 2003, was used. 
Developing an inventory of the current and planned agro-industrial investments in Mozambique 
and placing them within the typology of organizational forms under the vertical coordination 
between the agribusiness firms and the growers was also done. To achieve that and create the 
basis for more in-depth work on specific businesses, detailed secondary data were collected on a 
universe of over 300 rural based projects approved by the CPI between 1985 and mid-2001. The 
database and the analysis only include projects that are owned by the private sector. Therefore, 
 
33 The GPSCA, MA, realized a study of impact assessment for cotton and tobacco sector in Tete and Manica, from which the data respective to 
Tete was friendly provided. 
given the nature of their ownership, CI projects are not included. This was also aided by Rui 
Benfica, a good friend and economist, which also had this data. 
 
4.3.2. Data analysis 
All the data was captured in Microsoft Excel, SPSS for Windows and STATA SE 8.2. The 
analysis of the data was aided, also, by the Microsoft Excel, SPSS for Windows and STATA SE 
8.2. The assessment of whether the CF credit scheme can be considered as an alternative 
approach relatively to other credit sources, in order to get a higher outreach and real effects on 
the real economy, was realized with the use of econometric analysis tools, specifically the Logit 
model and the Linear regression model. 
 
Descriptive statistics and means test 
Descriptive statistics was used to give a description of the tobacco farmers of the studied 
districts, and to have an idea on their performance. Also means tests, such as independent 
samples t-tests, including student t-test and one-way analysis of variance were employed in the 
analysis. This was mainly used to compare statistics between the farmers under the CF’ credit 
scheme and the ones that are not under that scheme. Thus an inference into the welfare impact of 
CF’ credit scheme was made possible with some of these tests. 
The alternative hypothesis testing tool was used to investigate if there were significant 
differences, in terms of ease the credit constraints problems, between the smallholders under the 
CF’ credit scheme and the other credit sources scheme, in the case of the tobacco growing 
households of Tete province. 
Null Hypothesis:  0=− FSCF µµ  
Alternative Hypothesis: 0≠− FSCF µµ  
Where CFµ  - mean income for smallholders under CF scheme 
 FSµ  - mean income for smallholder under the other credit sources (government, formal 
financial sector, NGOs and associations), including the ones without any source. 
Since the assessment involves comparing means from different randomly selected samples, 
implying that they are independent random variables, the distribution of the null hypothesis will 
be the following 
[ ]2, CFCFN σµ  
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The decision criterion used is that when the computed t-value is positively larger than the 
tabulated t-statistic, corresponding to the significance level considered, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. To compound the t-statistic the following equation was used: 
( )YSEYt CFµ−=  
 
Econometric estimations 
Based on the data available and the nature of investigation, the maximum likelihood Logit model 
were found to best address the issue – is the CF’ credit scheme a relevant rural development tool 
in comparison to other credit sources? The dependent variable in this analysis is related to the 
dichotomous (dummy) variable of credit source, where 1 = farmers under CF scheme, and 0 = 
farmers under other credit sources. The Logit function is specified as: 
Logit Model - ( ) ( )( )ii XeXYp βα +−+=== 111Pr  
Where  - base of natural logarithms; e
iX  - vector of independent variables; 
 βα &  - model coefficients for the independent variables. 
The approach taken for the current study is based on the odds ratio, which estimates the change 
in the ln odds ( value)β for a unit change in the independent variable. Alternatively, we can say 
that is the odds ratio for one unit change in the independent variable. Thus cross sectional 
regression to be estimated will, in general look like the following (considering all the variables 
involved, with additional commands used in STATA for the odds ratio (or) and for the 
robustness in the errors (robust)): 
βe
( )( )
( )( ) ( )ii
i Xf
Xfcredshh
Xfcredshh =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=−
=
|1_Pr1
|1_Prln  
Where refers to the linear function of the variables grouped in: i) credit risk indicators, ii) 
household asset endowment, iii) household’s head education, iv) household’s head demographic 
characteristics, v) households activities, vi) tobacco related indicators, vii) the CF contractor, and 
viii) the households location. The objective of this analysis is to test whether CF’ credit scheme 
is more likely to provide a better possibility or higher accessibility probability compared to the 
other available sources of credit, when the following aspects are considered.  
( iXf )
The coefficients estimated from the regression above were odds ratio coefficients, which helped 
overcome the problem faced with the normal Logit model, where the coefficients are difficult to 
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interpret and are the natural logarithm of an odds ratio. An odds ratio below 1 indicates a 
decrease (that is, a unit change in the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the 
odds of the dependent being 1 in binomial logistic regression, or being the highest value in the 
case of multinomial logistic regression). An odds ratio above 1 indicates an increase (that is, a 
unit change in the independent variable is associated with an increase in the odds that the 
dependent equals 1 in binomial logistic regression, or being the highest value in the case of 
multinomial logistic regression). An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates the two variables are statistically 
independent. 
The econometric linear regression model used for estimating the factors influencing total income 
per household member in order to assess the second hypothesis proposed in the introduction 
chapter is given as follows:  
iiii XY εβα ++=  
Where  - dependent variable; iY
iX  - vector of independent variables, grouped as the previous model; 
 iε  - error (disturbance) term. 
 
5. Case Description of Mozambique - Tobacco Agro-industry’s 
Credit Farming’s credit scheme in Tete 
 
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is 
whether we provide enough for those who have too little. 
— Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
 
In this chapter a presentation of the empirical set of the study. Namely it draws upon the 
presentation of the results from the data collection and analysis of the hypothesis stated in the 
introduction chapter. It provides firstly a characterization of the setting to which the data is 
referred to, specifically the Tete province and the tobacco industry. Then follows 
characterization of the data collected, based on the sample mean test and other descriptive 
statistics instruments. The following section shows the results from the analysis or assessment of 
the hypothesis. And the last section is reserved for some thoughts about the results for the 
hypothesis assessment. 
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5.1. Background 
In terms of main characteristics of CF type of coordination in Mozambique, there is the 
following: i) 22.59% of the investment in the agro-industrial sector so far realized were in CF 
schemes; ii) The FDI portion (21.62%) of the investment is ranked in the second position, after 
the Loan; iii) 41.45% of the investment is oriented for the foreign market only; iv) Cotton, 
tobacco, tea oilseeds and maize production use to some extent CF scheme; v) Cotton and tobacco 
are the ones with higher level of investment using CF scheme; and vi) CF is more predominant 
in the northern part of Mozambique, specifically in Cabo Delgado and Zambézia34. 
Concession-based tobacco production is a growth industry in Mozambique. In the 2002/03 
season, Mozambique’s tobacco exports reached USD 30 million. The supply of input credit by 
tobacco companies is a key feature in this industry, and in practice all tobacco farmers receive 
input loans from the firms. In the same season, some 120 000 smallholders participated in 
tobacco production in Mozambique. The average area of tobacco per smallholder is estimated at 
0.5 hectares (Ruotsi, 2003). 
MA estimates that typical amounts of seasonal credit offered per smallholder vary between 
MZM 500 000 and MZM 1 000 000, or about USD 24 and USD 48. This would mean that the 
total annual disbursement of company credit to the sector would be around USD 2.5–5.0 million. 
As many new tobacco projects with ambitious production plans are in the pipeline, the input 
credit disbursements are likely to increase significantly in the coming seasons. In tobacco, some 
100 000 smallholder were estimated to receive company credit to a total annual value of USD 
2.5-5.0 million. Outside the cotton and tobacco concessions, experiments with CF and company 
credit delivery have been of a very limited scale only (Ruotsi, 2003). 
The Tete province contributes to the GDP in between 23% and 30%, most of which produced by 
family sector, being one of the provinces with agriculture potential. For example in 1999/2000 
campaign Tete contributed in 13.3% of the nation maize production, of which 99% came from 
the family sector. In spite of its importance, especially of the family and the micro-company 
dimension, they have been facing serious constraints on bank credit due to risk inherent to the 
activity itself and lack of real guarantees (ACP, 2003; DNCI, 1999) 
Tete’s financial sector is packed in to four banks, BIM, Banco Austral, BSTM and BCIF; Three 
micro-financial institutions (CMME, AMODER and FOS – Chitima); One Public fund (FFPI). 
The banks activity is more concentrated on savings services and little credit is destined to the 
informal commerce. The Public fund concentrates on micro and small businesses of industrial, 
 
34 For broader and detailed characterization of the Agro-industrial investments see the appendix A2. 
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fishery and commerce (including agricultural commerce) sectors. The micro-financial 
institutions have as active loans about USD 137,718.85, and about 1,754 clients. The group 
lending systems is the most common one, besides the individual lending practiced only by the 
AMODER. On average the loans range about USD 30 to USD 300 (ACP, 2003). 
Various companies operate CF schemes of tobacco in Mozambique and many are expanding 
their cultivation area. Their supplied items offered on credit commonly include tobacco seeds or 
seedlings, a selection of required fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides, equipment for cultivation, 
material to construct farm-level curing barns, bags for harvest, transport of crop to buying 
centres and extension services (Ruotsi, 2003). The ones that matters for the study, as already 
mentioned are MLT and DIMMON. Their contribution for the national production of tobacco, in 
terms of volume, was about 27,130.00 tons of Burley type of tobacco, 1,740.00 of Flue type and 
5,000.00 of Fired Cured type during the 2003/4 season, all amounting about 68.39% of the 
overall tobacco production.  
 
5.2. Sample characterization 
Descriptive statistics for both groups of under and not under the CF scheme households are 
shown in the Table B.2. The results from the means test suggest that, in terms of credit risk 
indicators there is a significant strong position for the ones under the CF scheme. Under the CF 
scheme the risk of the farming activity is highly inferior to the one outside. This may be related 
to the crop diversification and food insecurity issues for the ones not under the CF scheme. 
Another important indicator is the total income per household member, which suggests that the 
household have better perspectives under the CF scheme than not. 
On one hand, concerning the household asset endowment we see that the there is not a 
significant difference in terms of the labour endowment needed for both samples. On the other, 
concerning the level of education of the household’s head, we see that higher is the probability 
for the less educated to be outside the CF scheme. But one important point to see is that as the 
head becomes more educated the probability of being under the CF scheme also declines. This 
might be related to the fact that with more knowledge they begin a business outside the farming 
sector. 
And when analysed for their demographic characteristics, the fact that the household head is 
male or female has not that high impact, though higher probability is attributed for males. As 
they grow older, there is a transition, from their second twenties to above their third twenties, of 
the probability of being in the CF scheme to the outsider. Additionally, as expected, the higher 
probabilities of being in farming activity better chances are in CF scheme. The contrast found 
was that significantly higher portion of land is dedicated to the food crops under the CF scheme. 
As for the tobacco related indicators, not much can be said due to the methodoly adopted to fill 
the missing values in the dataset, the mean value estimation. Also for the companies dummy 
litlle can be said, because they are already involved in the CF scheme. When looking at the 
localization aspects, it possible to see that the district of Chifunde and Macanga have higher 
prospects compared to Angónia and Marávia. The surprising aspect here is that Angónia is 
considered to be one of the best agricultural sites of the country, and has higher prospects for 
family farming than commercial farming. 
 
5.3. Empirical assessment 
5.3.1. H1 assessment - The CF schemes can be considered as an alternative way to 
reach the rural growers, in terms of financial system’s credit channel 
Regression findings 
The results for the maximum likelihood Logit regressions can be seen on the Table B.3. The 
analysis starts with regression of the odds ratio of being under CF’s credit scheme with the credit 
risk indicators (1). The model is significantly explanatory of 28.69% of the variances of the 
credit source issue, though only farming activity risk effects different from zero. Higher risk of 
farming activity increases the odds ratio of credit funding from an agro-processing relative to the 
other credit sources in 1.769889 points per increment (about 76.99%35), ceteris paribus. The 
assetarea ratio plays a major role in influencing the odds ratio of the credit source, in about 
239.40% increase, though it is not statistically significant, ceteris paribus. 
When controlled for the household’s assets endowment (2), the explanatory level of the model 
improves significantly to 42.32% and, as expected the ratio of assetarea’s influence drops in 
about 106 percentage points (pp). On the other hand the farming activity risk, continuing 
significant, increases its influence to 92.91% the odds ratio of getting credit from the processing 
companies relative to the other sources, ceteris paribus. The interesting thing is that the 
coefficient of income per household member does not suffer change. It keeps increasing the odds 
ratio in about 171.80%, ceteris paribus. From the assets endowment indicators, only the hand 
tools indicator influences significantly the odds ration positively in 3.723634 times per unit of 
change, ceteris paribus. 
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35 The percentage is calculated as follows: ( ) 100*1−βe . The same formula was used for the other percentages reported in this section. 
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Next the households’ head educational and demographical characteristics are considered (3), 
which resulted on the income per member becoming significantly influential, though the level 
did not change. The owned area also became influential (about 2.238487 times per unit change), 
increasing the odds ratio of getting the credit from the processing companies relative to the other 
source the higher is the owned area, ceteris paribus. The odds ratio of being able to get credit 
relative to other sources of household’s head being man compared to woman, increases in about 
23.14318 times, ceteris paribus. There is also, not that high, improvement on the explanation of 
the variations between the credit being given either by the processing companies or the other 
sources considered. 
After considering for the household’s activities (4) the farming risk looses its significance. The 
proportions reserved, either for food crops or cash crops, becomes highly influential in the 
decision about the credit source. The higher the proportion is dedicated for both types of crops 
better are the odds ratio of being in the processing companies’ credit schemes relative to the 
other credit providers. The number of fields, in exchange of the area, becomes significantly 
influential, in about 6.5660 times per unit change, in the likelihood of the odds ratio for the credit 
source, ceteris paribus. Both, the hand tools and the income per member, does not suffer 
significant changes. As for the assetarea indicator, increases the odds ratio in 112.48% for higher 
assets over area ratio, ceteris paribus. Significantly higher is the explanatory power of the model. 
A peculiar, as expected, fact comes out from this regression. The impact of whether the 
household grows or not a cash crop is higher than whether they grow or not food crop. 
Introducing the tobacco related variables (5) the income per member looses his significance to 
the value of the given credit, which influences the dependent variable in 2.7180 times per unit 
change of the credit, ceteris paribus. The model continues to be significantly explanatory with a 
slight improvement to 59.78% of the variations of the dependent variable being explained by the 
regresses. The influence of the assetarea indicator increases to 2.107706, while the influence of 
the fields owned declines to 5.965543, ceteris paribus.  
When controlled for the MLT company (6), the value of the given credit’s impact on the 
dependent variable does not change. And the characteristic of producing food crops looses their 
significance and additionally both, the food crop and cash crop proportion indicator’s influence 
drops drastically. The model’s explanatory power improves slightly, maintaining its significance. 
The odds ratio of getting credit from a agro processing company relative to other credit sources, 
increases by 37.35998 times for MLT schemes compared to the not being under this processor, 
ceteris paribus. The indicator of owned fields and hand tools see their impact on the dependent 
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variable reduce slightly. As for the asset over area indicator, increases its influence in about 2.2 
pp. 
On the other hand when the DIMMON company is considered (7); the improvement of the 
explanatory power of the model improves slightly less compared to the MLT one. And on the 
contrary to the MLT one, here none of the variables (considered in the model 5) loosed their 
statistical significance, and their influence level (the coefficient) also maintained in general. 
Due to collinearity issues, the DIMMON company was not further considered in the analysis, as 
well as its localization district, Chifunde. This way when controlled for the location (8), the 
model of the MLT (6) improves significantly, to 66.61%. In addition the asset over area and 
owned fields become less statistically significant, in exchange of the second grid primary school, 
advanced ages (20 to forward), and the dummies for Angónia and Marávia districts. The MLT 
influence climbs when the districts where they operate are considered. The Angónia district 
influences in increasing the odds ratio in 0.6722% for the ones in that district compared to other 
districts, ceteris paribus. As for the Marávia district, it influence in 1.005871 times the odds 
ration when compared to the other districts. 
 
Hypothesis assessment 
The decision about whether the CF’s credit scheme is better or not, under the tobacco farming 
can’t be generalized only by the results from this study. But important insights can be collected 
here. There is a significant probability for the CF schemes becoming the propulsion of the rural 
financial market through its credit schemes. 
From the results it’s possible to see that the location (district), the land proportion reserved for 
each type of crop, the hand tools endowment, level of credit in terms of value are important 
determinants for the success of the CF’s credit scheme as alternative source of credit for the 
tobacco growers of Tete province. 
 
5.3.2. H2 assessment - Growers socio-economic characteristics, explain why they are 
better off under the CF than the traditional credit system 
Regression findings 
The results for the linear regressions related to the determinants of the income per member of the 
household can be seen on the Table B.4. The analysis is divided into two regressions, according 
to the location of the processing companies. The interest here is to see, separately for each 
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company’s area, if the credit scheme controlled for the households’ characteristics has a 
considerable impact on the income per household member. 
The first one (1) is related to the MLT’s scheme area. There it is possible to see that only the 
(normalized) household size and their activity characteristics, whether are in farming or outside 
farming, have statistically significant influence on the income per member, of -764.7078, 
505.5577 and 649.3870 respectively. The credit source dummy has a really high negative 
coefficient of 1,085.8160, though statistically not significant. And the model it self is not 
statistically significant, since Prob>F=0.1507. 
When looking at the area covered by DIMMON (2), the same inference can be made, only that 
there is higher influence from the same variables mentioned for (1). Specifically the household 
size costs to income per member 777.5770 per additional member. Each prospect of income 
outside the farming increases the income per member in 655.4203. And the farming activity 
contributes in about 510.0466 to the income per member. Here, as in the previous model (1), the 
credit source dummy has a really high negative coefficient, meaning that higher level of credit 
means reducing 1093.5310 in the income per member level, though statistically not significant. 
 
Hypothesis assessment 
The regressions showed that there is a relation between the income per member of the household 
and their characteristic, but it is not as strong to support the idea that their characteristics explain 
why they are better off under the CF scheme. But it also does not reject the idea that growers 
characteristics, like the household size, their core activities, whether is farming or/and outside 
farming do show some important effects on their well being. 
 
5.4. Assessment discussion 
The linkage between the agricultural sector and the agro-processing industry varies from contract 
based coordination to an ownership and associations. And depending on that structure different 
types of effects can emerge. If agriculture requires significant external inputs, growth in 
backward production linkage is expected. If output from agriculture requires processing before it 
can be sold or if there is significant value added by processing, forward production linkages are 
to be expected. If there is sufficient growth in the agricultural sector to induce rural income 
growth, expenditure linkages will induce growth in consumption and possibly in investment. 
This is, multiple and diverse linkages can be expected from a dynamic agricultural sector. 
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On the other hand, the funding of the rural areas determines the development of the rural 
economy, particularly the production and marketing components of agriculture sector. Here, the 
complexity of the credit problem is determined by multiple factors which transpose the financial 
markets borders. The identified constraints can’t be overcome by injection of financial resources 
only. On the supply side the main drawbacks are the debility of the few institutions operating in 
the rural areas and inexistence of the formal sector which limits their capacity in identifying and 
selection borrowers. On the demand side the lack of adequate management capability of the 
commercial agents in order to access the credit.  
But then again we can ask why is it profitable for firms to issue smallholder credit in areas where 
financial institutions are unable to do it on a sustainable basis? Simmons (2003) lists a number of 
advantages the marketing firms have over financial institutions in the operations. Through 
contracts with farmers, the company can monitor input use and establish a degree of control over 
crop management decisions that might jeopardize repayment. Firms can deduct repayments 
direct from crop payments, without having to rely on a third party to do this. They can also make 
future farming contracts depend on meeting repayment clauses of the current contract, a 
potentially strong repayment incentive in areas where no other source of input credit exists 
(Ruotsi, 2003).  
Additionally large marketing firms also can source funds from the formal financial sector, an 
advantage many small rural finance institutions do not have. But the core difference is 
considered by most writers to be that the companies hardly ever aim to make profit on the 
delivery of small credits but do it from the related produce transactions, and in this manner can 
bear the high transaction costs typical to smallholder credit. Adams et al (1992) summarizes 
these views: “I have yet to find a merchant who would not prefer cash transactions over those 
involving credit. This suggests to me that most merchants view lending as a necessary nuisance 
rather than as a way to sweat additional profits out of their clients”. Thus input credit is in most 
cases used to secure the volume and/or improve the quality of the produce the marketing 
company can buy, as a means to higher turnovers and profits from the marketing of farmers’ 
agricultural products (Ruotsi, 2003) . 
The CF scheme can be used as alternative way of providing credit to the smallholder in the case 
for missing financial formal markets. This way it can, temporarily, fulfil the missing links and 
allow the improvement of the linkages and the process of the development of the formal 
financial sector in rural areas. Though they can provide the credit, some additional aspects have 
to be taken in account for there to be a profitable arrangement between both, the framer and the 
company. As seen from the case study sample, there is a strong rationality for the companies to 
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take into consideration, above the credit risk indicators, farming activity characteristics, in 
addition to the location and the hand tools owned by the household when considering the CF’s 
credit scheme. Here the credit given also plays an important role in the decision process of the 
companies’ relation with the smallholder.   
Another important group of issues that has to be considered are related to the problem of the 
agriculture development is not limited only to the credit issue. There are also other aspects to it 
like the inputs and technology availability, access to markets, transportation and stocking 
facilities are few among the many existents. The CF scheme has the potential to overcome this 
issues helping in the improvement of the agricultural productivity and household incomes. It also 
can insure against the market failures. 
But at the same time it is also clear that company credit is not, and does not aim to be, a 
substitute for the operations of the financial institutions. The range of financial services provided 
by the marketing companies is very narrow, consisting in most cases only of small in-kind 
seasonal loans. Banks, MFIs, SACCOs and other financial institutions can offer a more diverse 
range of services, including savings, investment loans and money transfers, and are expected to 
do it in a transparent manner under relevant supervision arrangements. Therefore, patient and 
long-term development of rural financial institutions and services remains crucial for the 
progress of rural economies in Africa (Ruotsi, 2003). 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
People are idiots. Everyone is idiot (…). The only difference among us is that we’re idiots about 
different things different times. (…). I don’t know why the economy works, but I’m sure it isn’t 
because brilliant people are managing it. My guess is that if you sum up all the absurd activities of 
management, the idiocies somehow cancel out, thus producing cool things that you want to buy, such 
as Nerf balls and Snapple. Add up the law of supply and demand to the mix and you’ve pretty much 
described the whole theory of economics. 
— Scott Adams36
 
The operations and traditional production technology of the typical family farm, and its 
associated credit needs, are too small to warrant the economic extension of the formal credit 
system. This is due to: i) Agriculture’s high risk; ii) High costs associated with the selection and 
monitoring the credit beneficiaries of rural areas; iii) Risks associated with the low level of 
schooling and knowledge of business modern practices of the rural agents; iv) Lack of real 
guarantees; v) Weakness of the existent legal enforcement system; iv) High market interest rate 
and collateral requirements not adequate to them; vi) Risk aversion behaviour of the banking 
sector; and vii) Lack of political will on investing in agriculture from the banks part. Therefore, 
in short term can not be expected that the commercial banks would consider in their strategies of 
market expansion the agricultural commerce.  
Moreover, family farms typically do not generate sufficient marketable surplus to justify or 
service commercial bank credit. Thus the family sector production might be best fostered by: 
i) The credit demand being met trough extension of the use of the informal credit system and 
by trading system; 
ii) Facilitation by the banking sector the extension of credit to retailers and purchasers of 
family sector output and on-lending through these agents to the family producer; 
iii) Introduction of innovative lending instruments should accompany, not substitute, the 
enhancement of the bank’s networks outside the cities. 
Instruments could be introduced to finance the start-up costs of production activities of small 
entrepreneurs. One instance should be the introduction of small loans to family producers in 
cities and green zones to start-up production activities, using as a guarantee the wage of one 
other member of the household. These could reach potential borrowers that currently have no 
access to the formal banking sector either for lack of collateral or co-participation capital. 
 
36 In Adams (2000). 
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Another important measure could be that in rural areas not served by banks, traders should be 
allowed to borrow the finance the extension of credit for production inputs to small agricultural 
producers, who sell their crops to, and often also purchase inputs and consumer goods from, 
large traders. This type of arrangements, are already informally used in some areas in form of 
delayed payment for inputs which are purchased from the same traders who buy the farmer’s 
crops at harvest. While lending to traders that extend credit to their own customers is riskier, it is 
also cheaper, in terms of administrative costs, than direct consumer lending by banks. 
On the identification of the different coordination options, it was clear that there is not a unique 
scheme which could be considered as the most appropriate one in order to attenuate the 
constraint already mentioned. And as the problem of the agriculture development goes beyond 
only the credit issue, to inputs and technology availability, access to markets, transportation and 
stocking facilities are few among the many existents. There should by an integrated analysis of 
these issues in order to compute an strategic plan comprising both sectors, financial and 
agricultural, for the development of the agricultural sector. Here the linkages between the big 
and small enterprises are a key issue to be considered in order for the plan to be sustainable. 
As shown in the Table 1.1, agricultural sector has been receiving a considerable level of credit 
from the economy (an average of 19.18% during the 1998-2001 period). But on the distribution 
of the credit by crops, on the Table 1.2, clearly comes out the higher allocation of the credit to 
the cash crop industry (the large agricultural companies and the agro-industries) producing 
cotton, cashew and sugar (an average of 23.44%, 13.18% and 7.42% respectively during the 
1998-2001 period). Under this framework and considering that major part of the national 
agricultural produce comes from family farms, absorbing most of the working population, the 
agricultural companies and the agro-industries seems to be in better position towards the formal 
financial system (for credit) than the smallholders. 
The agro-industrial CF scheme was shown to be a good alternative to alleviate the credit 
constraint problem. The results also suggest that CF can be used as a way to link small-scale 
farmers with agribusiness, however on condition that the correct governance structures, good 
relation between the parties and reduction of transaction cost are taken into account. But at the 
same time it is also clear that company credit is not, and does not aim to be, a substitute for the 
operations of the financial institutions. The range of financial services provided by the marketing 
companies is very narrow, consisting in most cases only of small in-kind seasonal loans. 
Another important problem facing the agricultural development is the farmer defaults. This is a 
challenge which can be faced through introduction of different modalities, such as lending 
through groups, taking advantage of the fact that farmers are better informed on the credit 
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worthiness of community members, in addition to the cultural knowledge of the community. 
Another way could be co-operation between farmers, i.e., they share information on defaulters in 
order to be able to discriminate which farmer is trustable and which is under other companies’ 
scheme. This works as the risk centre, which exits in most banking systems. Also is important to 
establish good communication with the farmers. They help foster good company-farmer relations 
and a sense of trust, which can contribute to the reduction of strategic default. 
There also exist various problems linked with the weak legal and judiciary systems in Africa, 
which make enforcement of financial and commercial contracts difficult or expensive. Related to 
this issue is the wider problem of a lack of code of conduct between the firms and smallholders 
participating in credit-based input deliveries, resulting in widespread side-selling and side-
buying activities. A creation of procedures and mechanisms in areas such as the regulations for 
collective bargaining, conflict resolution and standard contracts, as well as developing an 
appropriate code of conduct for these operations could improve the solution of this problem. 
The public and private sector have complementary roles, based on the distinction between public 
and private goods. It is clear that the government should take care of such public goods as laws, 
law enforcement, fundamental research, public health, basic education, basic infrastructure, etc. 
and leave private-good activities such as animal slaughtering, cotton milling, transport of 
products, trade in seed, fertilizers and grain to the private sector. This is simple and straight-
forward, and forms the basis for privatization. But, as noted above, relying only on government 
and on markets is not enough for two reasons. First, the production of private goods can be much 
dependent on the availability of public goods. Second, many goods have shades of public and 
private goods characteristics. They are hybrid or mixed goods. If the investment in hybrid goods 
is left to the private sector there will be under- investment.  
There is also room for the government intervention aiming the improvement of the situation. 
Their role could be as: i) Providing seed capital, revolving funds or fiscal incentives to star-up 
these deals; ii) Offering favourable loan terms or insurance packages through state financial 
institutions; iii) Educating interested parties about experiences in other countries to improve 
knowledge on the subject matter through forest departments; and iv) Legal advice to interested 
parties and in the appropriate language and cultural setting can be provided to inform all parties 
of their rights in partnerships. There is no standard solution. Thus it will be country-specific and 
depend among other things on the level of development, the available assets and possible engines 
for spurring growth. 
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Socio-historic and political profile of Mozambique 
Mozambique, in the south-eastern cost of Africa (Figure 1), is located between the parallels 
10o27’ and 26o56’, latitude south and the meridians 30o12’ and 10o27’ to the east. According to 
the World Bank (WB), in 2002 18.4 millions inhabited this country (WB, 2004b), with over 80% 
living in rural areas (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002) and with an illiteracy rate about 56% 
amongst the adult population (WB, 2003). According to the National Statistics Institute (INE), 
the country is administratively divided into eleven provinces including the capital of the country, 
Maputo City, which also has the status of a province. Each province is divided into capital and 
districts which further divided into administrative posts. In total, Mozambique has 144 districts, 
33 municipalities, 68 towns and 387 administrative posts (INE, 2000). 
The country is crossed by several rivers including the Zambezi, and vegetation ranges from 
rainforest to grassy plains and semi-desert. The climate is hot and humid from October to March 
(the rainy season) but generally dry for the rest of the year. Both droughts and floods cause 
problems for farmers from time to time. Among 18.4 million Mozambicans, about 45% are 
under 15 years, so the population will keep growing rapidly. The capital Maputo has over a 
million inhabitants. There are ten major ethnic groups, and more than 30 different languages are 
spoken. Because of the colonial past, Portuguese is the official language, but English is 
increasingly been used. There is religious diversity: as well as many animists, there are large 
groups of Christians and Muslims (WV, 1999). 
According to the WB classification of countries based on Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita, Mozambique is ranked as a developing, low-income economy and in debt, with a total 
Gross National Product (GNP) being estimated in 1997 at USD 2.4 billions, and the per capita 
GNP at USD 143 (HDR, 2000). Currently, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is 
estimated at USD 195 (HDR, 2004). The government is still heavily dependent on external 
support, currently constituting about 17% of the overall GDP. 
The history of Mozambique can be traced as follows. Uring the period 1948-1975, it was a 
Portuguese colony. During this period, Portugal established a feudal system of ownership, which 
can be said to have enhanced the system of forced labour (known as Chibalo), for Mozambicans. 
During the late 1950s, a resistance emerge, the FRELIMO1 founded by Eduardo Mondlane and 
other Mozambicans. Since 1964, Mozambique became engaged in an armed campaign against 
the occupation of the Portuguese colonial powers, ultimately resulting in the signing of the 
historical Lusaka Agreement (Acordos de Lusaka) in September 1974. This allowed for a 
 
1 FRELIMO – the Mozambican Liberation Front, which has governed the country since 1975. 
transfer of power from the Portuguese colonial government to FRELIMO after on the 25th of 
June 1975. 
 
Figure 2 Map of Mozambique 
Source: UN, 2004. 
Post-independence, many of the portuguese population, along with local skilled and professional 
staff, started to leave the country. This exodus to Portugal (accompanied by sabotage of existing 
physical and social infrastructure) to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and the then 
Rhodesia, had an adverse effect on the country’s economy. For example, only 5 academic staff 
remained in the only university in the country (UEM, 1989). In order to address the resulting 
constraints in multiple spheres of development post-independence, the government started to 
layout and institutionalize radical reforms in all the economic spheres, based on centralized 
planning and grounded in socialist principles. Private schools were closed, businesses 
nationalized, and collective farms organized. In addition, the new government launched an 
ambitious economic program known as PPI (Indicative prospective plan), which had as target a 
rapid industrialization of Mozambique within 10 years period based on development by the State 
of enormous agriculture and industrial projects. But being an exuberantly ambitious and 
inadequate to the real necessities and capabilities it failed to conquer the target set after only 
 − ii −
 − iii −
                                                
three years because investment resources, in particular foreign exchange and public savings, 
were exhausted (Castel-Branco, 2001). 
Civil war began in the early 1980s between FRELIMO and RENAMO2, which undermined 
much of the ongoing reforms efforts that the government was undertaking. During this period, 
the country’s infrastructure, physical and communication infrastructure in the country, including 
telephone lines, and roads, the economic activity, health facilities and schools, were consistently 
targeted and destroyed for nearly two decades. This contributed to the problem of poverty and 
the general ruin of the socio-economic status of the population.  
As response, the government implemented the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program3 
(ESRP) in various sectors, while joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984, and 
initiated various policy reforms from 1987. However, these efforts were complex to implement 
because of the intensification of the war that was affecting most parts of the country, especially 
in the rural areas, which led to increasing the economic difficulties for vulnerable groups. The 
civil war seriously affected socio-economic development processes leading to inequity in 
growth, still being felt today. In addition, during 1990 and 1992, the loss of an important aid and 
export source, Soviet Union and drought that affected the region worsen the economic growth. 
After various rounds of negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the next phase of the 
country’s history can be seen to start after the signing of the peace agreement in 1992, which 
marked an end to the civil war (Awepa, 1992). This agreement led to free and peaceful 
multiparty elections in 1994. With the election of the new government, the country started to 
accelerate the implementation of the ESRP to meet the enormous challenge of economic and 
social rehabilitation. Nevertheless these various efforts, in the post-conflict years, the country has 
repeatedly been ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world (HDR, 1999).  
Since then Mozambique has been following a positive path of economic recovery, as a result of 
the macro-economic policy, considered worldwide to be the appropriate, in terms of structural 
reforms, like privatizations, financial system reform among others, as for the well managed 
monetary and foreign exchange policy and some budget contention (Coelho, 2000). Though, due 
to historical legacy of colonial rule and the civil war, the achievements of the ESRP have been 
considerably way below expectations, resulting in extremely poor economic and low social 
indicators as compared with other SSA countries. Currently the country’s GDP is USD 4.3 
billions, 54% of the population below national poverty line, 41 year of life expectancy and 60% 
of illiterates (WB, 2004a). 
 
2 RENAMO – Mozambican National Resistance. 
3 According to CEA, ESRP had three main objectives: poverty alleviation, economic growth enhancement and development of institutional 
capacity. 
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There is a broad political consensus that the main causes of the poverty are rural isolation, poor 
infrastructure and communication, poor health, low levels of education and an unfavorable 
climate for investment and trade (Compton, 2000). Nevertheless, both the Ministry of Finance 
(MF) and Agriculture (MA) have produced guideline documents compounded by series of policy 
initiatives, like SISTAFE4 and PROAGRI5 respectively, and the Action Plan for Absolute 
Poverty Reduction (PARPA6), with the purpose of improving their sectors performance (GoM, 
2001), and to support the general reconstruction and national development of the economy. 
While PARPA consigns objectives, targets and strategies for the national development policy, 
PROAGRI defines specific objectives and targets for the agricultural sector and rural 
development, and SISTAFE for the financial sector. 
As for the living conditions, in terms of average income, Mozambique is one of the world’s 
poorest countries, reflecting colonial neglect followed by years of war. Many households 
struggle to meet their own needs - poor urban families spend more than 70% of their income on 
food, and a crop failure can be disastrous for farmers. The basic diet of white maize or cassava 
made into porridge is high in carbohydrates but lacking in protein, vitamins and minerals. Rural 
villages are usually groups of circular straw or mud houses built near the fields. Many 
households rely on rivers, lakes or wells whose water is not safe to drink. Urban housing 
includes brightly painted cement apartments as well as makeshift homes constructed from scrap 
materials on the edge of town (WV, 1999).  
In the health sector malaria (which in turn causes energy-sapping anemia), measles, diarrhea, 
acute respiratory infections and tetanus are significant problems. The incidence of HIV/AIDS is 
increasing, especially along major transport routes. Poverty, malnutrition and poor sanitation 
contribute to illness and many child deaths. By the late 1990s, two-thirds of children enroll at 
primary school, but a shortage of trained teachers, materials and classrooms leads to low pass-
rates and consequent drop-outs. Access to education beyond grade five is even more limited 
(WV, 1999). 
As for the economic performance, over the last four decades, the relationship between 
investment and economic performance was very close up to 1980 (Graph 1), when investment 
and economic growth moved in opposite directions, due to the PPI, which is associated with 
massive increase in investment in large projects. Quite apart from a time lag between investment 
 
4 SISTAFE constitutes an integrated management systems, constituted by systems, subsystems, norms and administrative procedures related to 
Government finances and patrimony management In Parliament Assembly (2002) 
5 It is also referred as National program of public investment in agriculture is a 5 year agricultural sector investment and also aims the reform of 
the MA. Currently the second phase of it (PROAGRI II) is ongoing. 
6 PARPA, a comprehensive framework conceived as an instrument within the public planning system that makes the government’s five-years 
program operational. The key objective of PARPA is the reduction of absolute poverty and the main areas of focus are: education, health, 
agriculture and rural development, infrastructure, good governance and macroeconomic and financial management, In GoM (2001). 
and output growth, which is more noticeable with large investment programs, the investment 
plan for manufacturing had three negative effects (Castel-Branco, 2001).  
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First, existing capacity became largely under-utilised as result of the crowd-out of the funding. 
Second, most large projects were either not completed or did not receive the material inputs to 
work at close to full capacity. Third, massive investment financed through foreign borrowing 
quickly resulted in unsustainable debt service that forced the investment programme, and the 
projects associated with it, to collapse. 
The very pronounced increase in investment after 1997 (Graph 1) is explained by the large 
projects: sugar, cement, beer and, above all, Mozal and Motraco (aluminium smelter and its 
power station). The magnitude of these projects also implies that the time lag between 
investment and output growth is large (Castel-Branco, 2001) Services constitute the main 
component of GDP (Graph 2). The second most contributing to the GDP is the agricultural 
sector, with 33.67% on average for the period, followed other industries with an average of 
10.10% and by the manufacturing sector with an average of 9.44% (Castel-Branco, 2001). 
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Mozambican Agro-industry characterization 
A plethora of different institutional arrangements can be found worldwide prevailing in the 
relationship between productions, trade, and processing. In Mozambique, those forms can be 
summarized in three different types defined on the basis of the degree of vertical coordination 
between farmers and off-farm (or non-farm) businesses, namely: SM trading (coordination 
without any contract), CF and VI (ownership integration or plantation agriculture). Out of that 
continuum but interacting to a great extent in the dynamics of the markets is also the farmers 
cooperatives (rural associations – FC) (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002; Rehber, 1998). In 
some countries, NGOs also play an important role, as intermediaries, with the goal of helping 
those groups become profitable businesses associations. This section intends to characterize of 
the agro-industry activity and situate those different types of vertical coordination under the 
Mozambican agro-industry framework. 
 
Agro-industry and inter-institutions relations 
Rural agro-industrial development has the potential, if properly structured to relate to 
smallholders, to help reduce the rural poverty level, which for Mozambique is about 71% in 
about 80% of the country’s population living in rural areas. The influence of a particular agro-
industry in a given region varies depending on the set of factors that condition the relationship 
between the agro-industry and rural smallholders, from the crop specific characteristics to the 
economic and politic environment. The rural smallholders can benefit in terms of wage 
employment, increased income from the supply of raw material to the processing firms (Benfica, 
Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
The role of agro-industrial investments in reducing rural poverty levels in the country, in very 
general terms, is recognized in the PARPA (GoM, 2001). However, the development of specific 
strategies to enhance the impact of these investments on rural poverty in a consistent and 
sustainable manner has been target of little attention. Many questions regarding which and how 
to get the right kind of agro-industrialization are still to be answered – the kind that stimulates 
employment, reduces poverty and real food prices, stimulates real wages, improves food safety 
and protects the environment. 
The following paragraphs presents of an overview of the current agro-industrial investments in 
the country. Special emphasis is given to: i) How current agro-industrial investments fit within 
the broader universe of rural based investments; and ii) Characterization of the sub-sample of 
investments in agro-industry with respect to location, relationship with the smallholder sector, 
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sources of finance and market orientation and in the exposition of the Mozambique’s agro-
industry characterization. 
 
Sectored distribution of the rural based43 investments 
There has been a remarkable increase in the volume of investment in rural based projects, 
including agro-industry, over the past 15 years (see Table 2). The majority of the rural based 
projects (Table 1) are in the area of agriculture and livestock (43.6%) without a processing 
component, though representing only 22% in terms of investment value. Agro-industrial 
investments are the second major subgroup (34.7%) of all rural based projects. The remaining 
are projects in forestry and wood-works and other rural based projects. In terms of total value 
invested, agro-industry is the most important sector accounting for 59% of the total invested in 
the period. The average value of agro-industrial investments is also higher than the ones for the 
other sectors of activity. 
Table 3 Sectored Distribution of Rural Based Investment Projects 
All rural based Projects 
Value of Investments Distribution of projects 
Total Annual Average 
Sectors of activity 
Number % USD (103) % USD (103) 
Agriculture and Livestock 142 43.6 218,264.95 22.07 1,537.08 
Agro-industrial* 113 34.7 588,083.19 59.47 5,250.74 
Forestry/Wood-processing 60 18.4 174,448.65 17.64 3,007.74 
Other** 11 3.4 8,147.73 0.82 740.70 
Total 326 100 988,944.52 100.00 2,634.07 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
*Agro-Industry refers to any project that has an agricultural processing component, with or without a direct agricultural production component. 
** Other rural based projects 
 
Sub-sectored distribution of the agro-industrial investment 
There has been a significant inflow of capital to support investments from the signature of the 
peace agreement in 1992 and the subsequent first democratic elections of 1994 as shown in the 
Table 2. The total value invested in all rural based investment increased about 6.1 times from the 
period 1985-1990 to 1991-1996, but the level of investment on agro-industry did not 
accompanied this growth, it lagged behind, growing only 5.2 times. Then both more than 
doubled from that period to 1997-2001, having the agro-industrial investment decreased in about 
0.22 percentual points. Over the entire period, the focus of investment has moved from cotton to 
a higher diversification of investments in sectors like maize and cashew, in the first half of the 
1990's, and in sugar and tea in late 1990's. 
                                                 
43 The term rural based projects refers to those located in rural or peri-urban areas, employing directly or indirectly rural population and working 
with raw materials (or livestock) typically grown (or raised) in rural areas. These include activities such as medium and large-scale agriculture 
and livestock production, forestry and wood processing, wildlife related businesses, and agro-industrial activities. 
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Table 4 Agro-industrial investments by sub-sectors 
% of total Agro-industrial investment and sub-sector ranking 
1985-1990 1991-1996 1997-mid 2001 Total 
Sub-
sectors 
ranks Sectors % Sectors % Sectors % Sectors % 
1 Cotton 97.44 Cotton 26.55 Sugar 64.08 Sugar 41.53 
2 Tobacco 2.56 Cashew 25.44 Other 13.82 Cotton 15.72 
3 - - Other 20.09 Tea 5.26 Other 14.88 
4 - - Maize 19.63 Oilseeds 4.66 Cashew 8.51 
5 - - Oilseeds 4.81 Citrus 3.84 Maize 7.85 
All rural based investment 
Value (USD 103) 48,461.28 293,436.67 647,046.56 988,944.52 
Agro-industrial investment 
Value (USD 103) 33,481.28 173,477.07 381,124.83 588,083.19 
% of all rural 69.09 59.12 58.90 59.47 
As shown in the Table 3, 68% of the all projects fall within those seen as having forward 
production linkages with smallholders, as independent producers, in rural areas. This type of 
coordination, the SM, comprises the highest invested amount relatively to the other two, about 
45% of the amount invested in the period. Cashew, maize and oilseeds are the major sub-sectors 
targeted by SM in terms of agro-industrial investment projects (Table 3). In spite of representing 
small  share of  overall  agro-industrial  investment  projects, the  sub-sector of  sugar  represents 
Agro-industrial investment distribution by type of vertical coordination 
 
In terms of the overall accumulated investment over the 15 years analysed, the sugar sub-sector 
is the one targeted with the highest amount of investment, followed by the cotton sub-sector. The 
tobacco amounted to an investment of USD 4,118,820.00. Cashew sub-sector ranked 4th 
comprising an accumulated investment of USD 50,021,439.25. It is important to point here that 
the investment in the sugar industry is mostly on SM and VI coordination. Cashew sub-sector’s 
most investments are realized on SM basis. On the other hand, cotton’s investments are targeted 
in CF type of coordination.  
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on CPI Archives. 
Notes: There are in total nine (9) processing sectors included: Maize, sugar, tea, cashew, tobacco, fruits, oilseeds, cotton and other. Other includes 
a mix of processing sectors, including coconut, rice, pigeon pea, wheat, etc. Since we are only counting the first 5 major investments per period, 
the percentages do not necessarily sum up to 100. 
 
Graph 1 Agro-industrial investments by sub-sector 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
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Table 5 Vertical coordination type, location and sub-sectored distribution of agro-industrial investments 
 
Agro-industrial investment projects Value invested in Agro-industrial projects (USD 103) 
% within type of link 
Top three locations 
Sub-sector 
SP        CF VI Total SM CF VI Total % of invest. projects % of value invested 
Maize           18 1 3 22 44,266.84 603.99 1,277.11 46,147.95 Maputo Maputo
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Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
 
 − v −
the major target in terms of value of investment, among the sub-sectors, followed by the maize and 
cashew sub-sector. It is important to note here that although constituting the highest in terms of 
accumulated value of investment, the SM arrangement in terms of average value invested falls to 
the last rank. 
VI and CF arrangements amounts 23% and 22% respectively of the approved projects. As for the 
amount of investment for the all-period, VI arrangement comes in the second place, after the SM 
arrangement, representing 33%. On average, VI arrangement was the one with the highest amount 
of investment of USD 8,407,585.75, inducing the idea that it requires highest level of investment 
relatively to other two institutional arrangements in order to be operational. This reflects the capital-
using or labour-saving nature of the institutional arrangement. The tea sub-sector, in Zambézia 
province, is the one with higher number of projects with VI arrangement in view, comparatively to 
the other sub-sectors. However, the sugar sub-sector attains the highest rank concerning the value of 
investment (Table 3). 
Concerning the CF arrangement, although it represents the lowest accumulated amount of 
investment, USD 132,848,492.62, over the period 1985-2001, in terms of average value of 
investment it ranks in second position, above the SM arrangement, with USD 6,038,567.85 (Table 
4). This type of institutional arrangement is predominant in cotton, tobacco, tea and oilseeds 
production areas. It is important to point out the recent emergence of the investments by several 
tobacco companies in CF and processing operations in the north of the country, like Tete. 
Table 6 Agro-industrial investments by institutional arrangements with smallholders 
Agro-industrial investment 
Value of investments Distribution of 
projects Total Average 
Vertical coordination type 
Number % USD (103) % USD (103) 
SMs – processing with independent smallholder 
producers (SM) 68 60.18 261,860.22 44.53 3,908.36 
Contract coordination – processing with CF (CF) 22 19.47 132,848.49 22.59 6,038.57 
VI – processing with plantation agriculture (VI) 23 20.35 193,374.47 32.88 8,407.59 
Total 113 100 588,083.19 100 6,118.17 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
Note: Given its nature, Farmer Cooperatives/Community Integration (FC) arrangements are not included in this analysis. 
 
Agro-industrial investment distribution by location 
When looking at the distribution by province of the rural based and agro-industrial investments, 
Table 5, an uneven distribution and somewhat concentrated comes up to the observers’ eye. Of the 
all investment projects, 44% are located on the south part, 68% of which are in Maputo province. 
As we move towards north, the level of investment diminishes. We find that 32% are located in the 
centre and the remaining 24% in the north. The reasons explaining the uneven distribution are: i) 
The structure and the conditions of the rural marketing infrastructure; ii) The differential natural 
 − vi −
resource base across the regions; and iii) The inherited structure of investments left by the colonial 
settlers and the lack of coherent rural and agro-industrial development policies in the past decades 
(Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
From the estimated total of USD 973,948.00 invested during the period, the central and south part 
of the country, differently from the project distribution, had an equal amount invested of about 42% 
of the total investment of the period in analysis. The north part, as in terms of the number of 
projects, ranked last with 17% of the total amount invested in the period. Maputo province had 
about 34% of the total investment, the highest of the country, followed by Sofala and Zambézia 
province on the central part, with 22% and 13% respectively. As for the north part, Nampula 
province was the one that got the most interest from the investors, getting 8% of the overall 
investment realized. 
Turning to the distribution of the institutional arrangements over the country (Table 5), in terms of 
number of projects, the SM and VI arrangement is predominantly present in Maputo province, 
particularly in the maize milling sub-sector and sugar respectively (Table 3). This province also 
toped in the maize milling and sugar sub-sectors, in terms of the investment value, on the SM and 
VI arrangement respectively. In respect to SM arrangement, the central provinces of Manica and 
Sofala have some important emerging investments in mango and citrus, which have very significant 
growth prospects for the coming years. These investments rely heavily on Middle Eastern capital 
and have a secure export market in that region (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
Regarding the CF arrangement, Zambézia and Nampula provinces are the most targeted ones in 
terms of number of investment projects, accounting about 29% and 24% respectfully. The 
predominant regions, in terms or value of investment, that together account for over half of the CF 
investments in the country are Nampula and Zambézia provinces, especially in cotton sub-sector. A 
recent phenomenon under this arrangement is Tobacco production. In terms of values invested in 
CF types of projects, from the estimated USD 130,446.00 invested in the period, in Zambézia, Cabo 
Delgado and Nampula accounted 40%, 25% and 13% respectfully. 
 
Agro-industrial investment distribution by source of funds 
Mozambique is the last 13 years, since the peace agreement between the FRELIMO and RENAMO, 
has been one of the most looked at country, among many other developing countries, by the 
international community due to, mainly its economic performance and poverty reduction policies. 
This  way  it  has  been  targeted by  FDI and  also by  a growing  NDI.  In  specific 6% off the agro 
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Table 7 Rural based and Agro-industrial investments by province 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
 
Agro-industrial projects Rural based projects 
SP   CF VI Total
No. Value (USD 103) No. 
Value (USD 
103) No. 
Value (USD 
103) No. 
Value (USD 
103) No. 
Value (USD 
103) 
Province 
% (of 
projects) % 
% (of 
projects) % 
% (of 
projects) % 
% (of 
projects) % 
% (of 
projects) % 
Niassa      12 15,234.87 1 3,257.42 1 4,288.08 1 437.00 3 7,928.50
 3.68 1.54         
        
          
           
          
       
         
          
          
        
       
           
     
           
       
          
      
           
       
           
     
1.47 1.24 4.55 3.23 4.53 0.23 2.65 1.36
Cabo Delgado
 
22 71,391.95 5 6,379.35 2 33,227.99 - - 7 39,607.34
6.75 7.22 7.35 2.44 9.09 25.01 - - 6.19 6.73
Nampula
 
40 77,268.82 15 23,406.97 5 17,123.12 4 21,725.01 24 62,255.10
12.27 7.81 22.06 8.94 22.73 12.89 17.39 11.23 21.24 10.59
Zambezia
 
30 124,543.66
 
3 9,820.50 6 52,794.40 6 12,771.80 15 75,386.70
9.20 12.59 4.41 3.75 27.27 39.74 26.09 6.60 13.27 12.82
Tete 5 19,530.13
 
1 45.18 - - - - 1 45.18
1.53 1.97 1.47 0.02 - - - - 0.88 0.01
Manica
 
37 51,622.39
 
3 11,927.35
 
2 2,561.11 2 971.53 7 15,504.99
 11.35 5.22 4.41 4.57 9.09 1.93 8.70 0.50 6.19 2.64
Sofala
 
36 219,110.11
 
3 19,932.39
 
4 11,080.57
 
2 72,460.04
 
9 103,473.00
 11.04 22.16 4.41 7.61 18.18 8.34 8.70 37.47 7.96 17.59
Inhambane
 
16 18,796.64
 
10 15,493.09
 
- - - - 10 15,493.09
 4.91 1.90 14.71 5.92 - - - - 8.85 2.63
Gaza
 
31 63,067.78
 
7 12,547.42
 
2 11,773.22
 
1 9,000.00 10 33,320.64
 9.51 6.38 10.29 4.79 9.09 8.86 4.35 4.65 8.85 5.67
Maputo
 
97 328,378.16
 
20 159,005.55
 
- - 7 76,009.13 27 235,014.68
 29.75 33.20 29.41 60.72 - - 30.43 39.31 23.89 49.96
Total
 
326 988,944.51
 
68 261,860.22
 
22 132,848.49
 
23 193,374.47
 
113 588,083.19
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
industrial projects were funded by the DDI and 3% by the FDI. Joint forces between the FDI, 
DDI and the Loans given have contributed by 89% in the projects approved. 
 
Graph 2 Agro-industrial projects by source of funds 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
Categorizing the amount invested by the type of funding, we see that, in the Table 6, 64.21% of 
the investment has come from Loans. And contrary to the shown above, where higher number of 
projects is funded by the DDI (6%), of the overall amount of invested amount 20.35% is FDI and 
44% of DDI. The CF scheme has major part of its funding, from Loans, followed by the FDI. 
The FDI has as target the VI schemes and the DDI relies more on SM schemes. This can be 
justified as the domestic investors’ beliefs that higher fixed cost level is not good for agro-
industrial business, additionally to the fact of poor infrastructural framework. On the other side 
the foreign investors may believe in controlling the production process, controlling thus the 
quantity and above all the quality of the produce. 
Table 8 Agro-industrial investments by type and by institutional arrangement types 
Agro-industrial projects 
SM CF VI Total 
Total value invested (USD 103) 
Source of funds 
Total value invested in % 
39,639.85 24,574.87 26,572.65 90,787.37 Domestic direct investment (DDI) 15.14 18.50 13.74 15.44 
42,626.59 28,716.91 48,682.28 119,661.78 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 16.14 21.62 25.18 20.35 
179,957.78 79,556.72 118,119.55 377,634.04 Loans* 68.72 59.89 61.08 64.21 
261,860.21 132,848.49 193,374.47 588,083.19 Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
* It includes domestic and foreign loans. 
The Table 7 shows an overview of the type of market targeted by the agro-industrial investment, 
considering each of the coordination type. It indicates that while most of SM and VI investments 
are oriented towards the domestic market or to a combination of domestic and foreign, CF are 
mostly oriented towards the export markets or to a greater extent to a combination but not to the 
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domestic market alone. As can been seen higher level of investments is realized in a 
diversification strategy, i.e., targeting both markets. 
Table 9 Agro-industrial investments by market orientation 
Agro-industrial projects 
SM CF VI Total 
% of projects 
Total value invested (USD 103) 
Market Orientation 
Total value invested in % 
39.71 - 47.83 33.63 
55,754.63 - 22,031.14 77,785.77 Domestic market 
21.29 - 11.39 13.23 
4.41 31.82 4.35 9.73 
2,489.50 55,186.98 1,618.70 59,295.18 Foreign market (exportation) 
0.95 41.54 0.84 10.08 
55.88 68.18 47.83 56.64 
203,616.09 77,661.52 169,724.63 451,002.24 Domestic and foreign market 
77.76 58.46 87.77 76.69 
100 100 100 100 
261,860.22 132,848.49 193,374.47 588,083.19 Total 
100 100 100 100 
Source: 1985-2001 Project Database based on the CPI archives. 
 
Agro-industry and CF in agriculture 
The CF arrangements are best viewed in SSA as a response to widespread failure of input and 
credit markets and to poor or absent service provision. In addition to the need to ensure sufficient 
volume of purchases to reduce unit processing costs, concerns about product quality often 
significantly affect the structure of these relationships (Ruotsi, 2003; Benfica, Tschirley and 
Sambo, 2002; Key and Runsten, 1999; Rehber, 1998; Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997; Watts, 
1992). Examples of CF in Mozambique are predominantly found in the cotton and tobacco sub-
sectors. Most schemes take the form of forward resource/management contracts. According to 
Jaffee and Morton (1995) those differ from the simple sale/purchase contracts because they 
include stipulations regarding the transfer and use of specific resources and/or managerial 
functions (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). Forward resource management contracts 
partially internalize product and factor transactions, and are sometimes referred to as interlinked 
contracts or interlinked markets (Poulton, Dorward and Kydd, 1998). 
Currently in the country, farmers have little access to agricultural inputs and credit markets due 
to the market failure in rural areas. The contracts, most of which are informal, are designed to fill 
that gap and consist essentially in firms supplying credit, seeds and other inputs (including 
chemicals) and technical assistance for the production to farmers on specific areas of land of the 
product in question and farmers to use those inputs as instructed, and to sell their production to 
the firms at harvest at agreed-upon prices. The costs supported by the firms are deducted at the 
time of the harvest. In most cases, government has granted the firm monopsony power, i.e., the 
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farmers are not allowed to sell outside the scheme they are assigned to. To reduce transaction 
costs, where farmer associations have been established, firms have frequently signed contracts 
with associations that represent a group of farmers (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). This 
scheme is normally implemented in land “owned” by the individual farmers or farming 
communities, but there are cases where the firms use designated areas or blocks within their own 
land concessions for that purpose (Strasberg, 1997).  
But this scheme also comprises several potential limitations. First, widespread contractual 
coordination may raise price volatility in the remaining SM transactions, due to the thinness of 
those markets and the lack of transparency across many contracts within the same sub-sector. 
This will reduce or distort the information supplied by those SM prices. Second, CF 
arrangements may result in barriers to entry for farmers when processors limit suppliers to those 
who have given capabilities of meeting volume and standard requirements or have selected 
characteristics in the community - the already better off farmers for example. Third, these 
arrangements may result in a highly asymmetric bargaining situation where one or fewer buyers, 
often with monopsony power, can largely determine the prevailing price. Fourth, the cost of 
enforcing contract provisions can be very high due to opportunistic behaviour by participants 
(both farmers and processors) and weaknesses in the existing legal system. As a result, CF is not 
always an economically viable alternative in the SSA setting (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 
2002).  
In terms of main characteristics of CF type of coordination in Mozambique we have the 
following: i) 22.59% of the investment in the agro-industrial sector so far realized were in CF 
schemes; ii) The FDI portion (21.62%) of the investment is ranked in the second position, after 
the Loan; iii) 41.45% of the investment is oriented for the foreign market only; iv) Cotton, 
tobacco, tea oilseeds and maize production use to some extent CF scheme; v) Cotton and tobacco 
are the ones with higher level of investment using CF scheme; and vi) CF is more predominant 
in the northern part of Mozambique, specifically in Cabo Delgado and Zambézia. 
A.3. Growth linkages and rural development 
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Growth linkages and rural development 
Agro-industrial investments can have direct (1st round) and indirect (2nd round) effects on the 
rural development1. The direct effects correspond to the immediate effects like income variations 
and employment. The indirect effects are related to the way direct effects influence other aspects 
of socio-economic life of the rural area. These spin-off effects on local activities from the 
spending of increased farm incomes are called agricultural growth linkages, quantified through 
growth multipliers, and they were shown to be an important element in the creation of rural 
industry in Asia following the Green Revolution in cereals production. There are six types of 
intra-sector linkages, two in the factor markets (capital and labour) and two in the production 
markets (backward and forward production), and two in the expenditure market (consumption 
and investment linkages) (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002; Davis, et al.,B. Davis, Reardon, 
T., Stamoulis, K. and Winters, P., 2002; Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998). 
The type of investment also plays an important role in influencing the capacity of the farmers’ 
organizations to make their own socio-economic choices and become full actors in the market. 
With the contract/business type of investment the opportunity to influence agricultural and rural 
development policy may arise, but the issues tend to be limited to specific commodities or 
products that are part of a company’s investment program. In this case, democratic conditions 
that create opportunities for negotiation are essential for farmers to become part of the main 
stream business and civil society. Without such conditions, there might be little incentive or 
pressure for companies to accommodate to farmer demands (Bingen, Serrano and Howard, 
2003). 
With the process/technology type of investment non-governmental organizations or various 
types of donor-funded projects frequently limit the opportunities to develop farmer capacity for 
problem-solving and tend to define a continuing role for themselves as outside mediators. 
Farmer access to agricultural goods and services is limited and is often subordinated to, or 
dependent upon, the source of external funding. The investment in process/human capacity 
requires a long-term and focused commitment to develop human skills and social capital, 
including support for collective self-help capacity building. In contrast to technology-driven 
efforts, this type of investment values and encourages learning in order to deal with a broader set 
of actors and market opportunities. Based on this investment, access to agricultural goods and 
services tends to be demand driven as farmers play a key role in identifying their needs, and in 
capitalizing and managing their organizations (Bingen, Serrano and Howard, 2003). 
 
1 Rural development is considered helping rural people set the priorities in their own communities through effective and democratic bodies, by 
providing the local capacity; investment in basic infrastructure and social services. Justice, equity and security; dealing with the injustices of the 
past and ensuring safety and security of the rural population, especially that of women, In _______ (1997). 
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As for the linkages, backward production linkages in Africa are generally limited because of the 
low inputs in agriculture. Forward production linkages depend largely on the commodity being 
produced and the type of processing. Expenditure linkages are critical for African rural 
development: they are the primary mechanism by which agricultural growth affects the non-farm 
sector. To foster the development and expansion of farm/non-farm linkages in Africa, there must 
be an emphasis on improving agricultural technology. Backward and forward production 
linkages require modern agricultural-production systems (Davis, et al.,B. Davis, Reardon, T., 
Stamoulis, K. and Winters, P., 2002).  
The primary focus here will be the linkages in the production market2, more specifically on the 
agro-industrial investments and their forward linkages as a key source of loan/credit to 
smallholders and also as the key for the first round of income effects, both of which can lead to 
significant rural development. This section is intended to delineate the referred types of linkages, 
and present evidence of their size in SSA3 - through previous research that estimated growth 
multipliers. The ultimate objective is to link the issue of growth linkages to credit activity of 
agro-industries.  
 
Backward Linkages 
These linkages refer to demand for inputs derived from the new activity, i.e., new agricultural 
producers require inputs (from the non-farming activities4) to be able to produce, for example the 
new net demand for logs arising from establishment of a saw mill (Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 
1998). Examples of non-farm activities that supply inputs to farming activities include 
blacksmithing, metalworking and repair and fertilizer production. The type and magnitude of 
these linkages depend on the prevalent agricultural technology, size of holdings, and type of crop 
and whether production is irrigated or rain fed (Haggblade, Hazell and Brown, 1988). Research 
in SSA has found the size of those linkages to be considerably smaller than what is found in 
Asia. Limited use of fertilizer, agricultural equipment and irrigation in SSA determines this low 
order of magnitude (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
 
Forward Linkages 
New productive activities that arise as a result of having a new intermediate product on the 
market are the forward linkages. For example, the increased output of boards from the saw mill 
 
2 See Davis, Reardon, Stamoulis and Winters (2002), Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo (2002), Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly (1998), and Haggblade, 
Hazell and Brown (1988) for a comprehensive definitions and integration on sub-Saharan reality. 
3 See Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly (1998), Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell (1991) and Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown (1988) for a 
comprehensive and broader survey of growth linkages and multipliers for SSA. 
4 The non-farm sector is defined here to include all processed agricultural goods. 
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(or decreases in the price of boards) would stimulate the construction industry (Delgado, 
Hopkins and Kelly, 1998). These linkages are said to be about ten times more important than 
backward linkages in SSA (Haggblade, Hazell and Brown, 1988). Among forward linkages in 
SSA, links with food processing have been identified as the most important, followed by 
distribution of agricultural products. By focusing exclusively on micro and small scale rural 
enterprises, many of the studies undertaken in the region have hidden the role of larger scale 
processing activities that take place predominantly in rural areas or are at least linked to those 
areas (Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo, 2002). 
 
Agricultural growth multipliers 
Growth multipliers indicate the upper limits of the extra net income that could be in rural areas 
from new production of non-tradable goods and services stimulated by consumer and 
intermediate spending of new household income deriving from the tradable sectors. These 
increments to income could come from technological progress in the production of tradable 
items, improvement in export prices, and so forth. Although the concept of agricultural growth 
linkages goes back at least to the 1950s — drawing on Ricardo in the early 19th century and 
Keynes in the early 20th — quantitative estimation of multipliers incorporating consumption as 
well as production demand is relatively recent. Peter Hazell and Steven Haggblade have been 
key contributors in this regard. Much of the existing literature on modelling agricultural 
multipliers is reviewed by Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell (1991) and Haggblade, Hazell, and 
Brown (1989) (Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998). 
Hazell and Haggblade’s (1990) estimates from the cross-sectional econometric analysis show 
that on average for the whole of India an increase in agricultural income of 100 rupees will 
generate an additional 64 rupees in rural non-agricultural income, a 6 rupees difference with 
Rangarajan’s (1982) result. In Punjab and Haryana areas, an equivalent increase in agricultural 
income will generate an additional 93 rupees, and in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar areas, it will 
generate only an additional 46 rupees. Hazell, Ramasamy, and Rajagopalan (1991) estimated the 
change in value-added relative to an initial change in gross output generated by an income-
increasing technological change in agriculture, for North Arcot, India, and found that an in 
crease in agricultural income of 1 rupee will generate an additional 0.87 rupee in non-agricultural 
income. This can be seen in the Table 1.  
In SSA, still on Table 1, the agricultural growth multipliers estimated till date, range from 1.27 
in Mauritania, 1.50 in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, 1.66 in Malawi, 1.96 in Niger, 2.48 in Senegal’s 
Central Groundnut Basin, 2.57 in Zambia, 2.81 in Nigeria’s Gusau to 2.88 in Burkina Faso, and 
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in Madagascar a small increment of value added in agriculture increases overall value added by 
as much as 2.0 to 2.7 times the initial shock (Dorosh and Haggblade, 1994). This shows that the 
spin-off effect on local activities from the spending of increased farm incomes are relatively 
high, enforcing this way the agro-industrialization of the rural areas in order to achieve rural 
development. 
Table 1 Agricultural growth multipliers in Africa and Asia 
Study Location 
Value of total income growth 
from $1.00 of direct growth 
in agricultural income 
Rangarajan (1982) India, all 1.70 
Bell, Hazell, and Slade (1982) Malaysia, Muda River region 1.83 
Hazell (1984) Malaysia, Muda River region 1.82 
Hazell and Haggblade (1990) India, all 1.64 
 India, Punjab and Haryana 1.93 
 India, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar 1.46 
Hazell, Ramasamy and Rajagopalan (1991) India, North Arcot and Tamil Nadu 1.83 
Rogers (1986) Mauritania 1.27 
Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly (1998) Niger 1.96 
 Senegal, Central Groundnut Basin 2.48 
 Zambia 2.57 
 Burkina Faso 2.88 
Haggblade, Hazell and Brown (1988) Sierra Leone and Gusau, Nigeria 1.50 
Dorosh and Haggblade (1994) Madagascar 2.0 – 2.7 
Simler (1994) Malawi 1.66 
Haggblade, Hazell and Brown (1987)   
      Assuming millet,  sorghum  and  maize 
      are non-tradable Nigeria, Gusau 2.81 
Source: Benfica, Tschirley and Sambo (2002), Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly (1998), Dorosh and Haggblade (1994), Rogers (1986).  
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Agency theory and contract bargaining 
Several aspects of the New Institutional Economics, such as contract theory, agency 
relationships (principle agent problems, incomplete contracts), transaction costs and the 
boundaries of the firm have become key focus areas (Barry, Sonka and Lajili, 1992). This 
theoretical framework is useful in analyzing the relationships between the farmer (agent) and the 
agribusiness (the principal), where decisions about the extent of vertical coordination and related 
contract specifications can influence the financial position and performance of both parties. 
The profitability of CF for the company will depend to a large extent on the company’s 
bargaining power relative to the suppliers and its contract enforcement costs. This is equally true 
for the growers as well. The agency theory (PA game) best explains the determinants of 
bargaining power in this scenario. Here – the principal being the firm and the farmer being the 
agent – the firm defines the terms of the contract with an anticipation of how the agent will 
respond to the strategy it proposes. But the firm will not be able to observe with certainty – due 
to information asymmetry – whether the poor performance, e.g. low yield, is due to acts of 
nature, poor management or contract violation by the grower. Thus in the PA game, the firm 
maximises its profit subject to the constraints that the grower will accept the contract and that the 
farmer will abide by the terms of the contract (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
The firm will also be constrained by the costs, both direct and indirect (transaction). Direct costs 
will be determined by the contract terms. The transaction costs include per-grower costs that are 
of a fixed amount regardless of the size of the grower. These include items such as the costs of 
screening applicants, negotiation of the contract terms, monitoring grower behaviour (i.e., 
ensuring that specified production practices are followed), and providing information (e.g., 
extension services). The firm will also incur transactions costs that are proportional to the level 
of production. The grower, on the other hand, his participation decision will be influenced by 
three issues: the relative risk premium of the activity, shadow values of the credit and shadow 
prices of the labour (Warning and Hoo, 2000). 
The farmer, on the other hand, maximises his returns subject to the participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints. The principal must ensure that agent gets at least what other 
opportunities available provides in order to the farmer be willing to participate. Secondly, the 
principal can only provide some incentive package in order to influence the farmer to follow the 
best direction for him, but is not able to choose the agent’s action directly (Macho-Stadler and 
Perez-Castrillo, 2001; Key and Runsten, 1999). Thus, if the agency theory (PA theory) holds, a 
major element in contract compliance is providing the smallholder with credible prospects, and 
desire, for contract renewal. In this regard, smallholders can be seen as collateralizing future 
income rather than assets to secure upfront transfers from contracts. The contract must be 
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sufficiently attractive to the smallholder so that the costs of default (related to exclusion in future 
seasons) exceed the benefits from default (such as being able to pocket forward payments). If a 
contract is only marginally attractive in terms of profit then default risk is higher. Because the 
company has a quasi-monopsony it only has to allow reservation utility for the farmers so as to 
keep them under the contract. 
The grower will accept the contract if it offers him greater returns than any alternative available. 
Thus competing agro-processing companies operating in the region determines how the firm has 
to set profitable terms in the contract. If there is competition in the agro-processing industry the 
farmers’ level of profit will be bid up, while the firm will be having less bargaining power. When 
farmers face competition from other potential suppliers, their bargaining power is reduced. But 
the farmers yield greater bargaining power when they negotiate contracts collectively. It is 
possible for both the farmers and firms’ organisations to have market power, resulting in 
bargaining game with an indeterminate outcome (Key and Runsten, 1999). In that case the 
balance of bargaining power will lean on the specificity of their productive assets, that is, the 
degree to which an asset is specialised for a particular product or trade. The greater the asset 
specificity, the less is the bargaining power. 
Given the failures in legal institutions in most developing countries, the costs associated with 
enforcing a contract would be quite high. With significant monopsony power, the firms are better 
positioned to enforce contract terms via threats of withholding future contracts. The farmers have 
little incentive to violate terms of the contract if they are planning to grow the crop for at least 
more than one season. This further weakens the bargaining ground of the farmers. Its effect will 
be low profitability of their operations than would be the case if there were competition on the 
market. The price of inputs can be pegged at exorbitantly high prices or their products fetch 
below the market prices. Given the contentious issue of quality standards and grading with some 
crops, the farmers stand to lose profitability even further where there are no clear, pre-arranged 
grading criteria (Key and Runsten, 1999).  
Table 1 summarises the market imperfection conditions that would influence organisational 
strategies, particularly those that would favour smallholder growers and whether the presence of 
market failures or high transaction costs would tend to increase (+) or decrease (-) the likelihood 
of observing one of the coordination type. There are certain characteristics of farmers that firms 
can exploit, and use them to their benefit in CF. Market imperfections result in such 
characteristics as high shadow value of liquidity, high risk-aversion, and high levels of family 
labour relative to land endowment among the farmers. These are some of the characteristics that 
would make firms employ CF as their first best strategy, ahead of the SM or VI (Key and 
Runsten, 1999). 
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Table 1 Influence of market failures on processor organizational strategies and scale of contract farmers 
Market imperfections and transaction costs Organisational strategy *
Characteristic of Outgrower favoured under 
CF Scale 
**
 SM  CF VI   
Imperfect credit market resulting in high costs of credit to Outgrower – firm act as 
lender via resource providing contract 
- + +- High shadow value of liquidity S 
Imperfect insurance market and high crop price risk – firm acts as insurer via 
forward contract 
- + + Highly risk averse with poor ability o self insure S 
High labour supervision costs due to crop/technology requirements + + - High ratio of total labour being self-supervised S 
Missing markets for family labour and land (labour-intensive crops) + + - High levels of family labour relative to land 
endowment 
S 
One or few processors resulting in market power for processors (monopsony) - + - ? ? 
Organised farmers have market (bargaining) power (monopoly) + - + Unorganised growers S 
Growers have few alternative income/production opportunities - low bargaining 
costs for firm 
- + - Poor, with few productive assets S 
High contract enforcement costs (poorly functioning legal institutions) + - + Less likely to default on contract ? 
Source: Adapted from Key and Runsten (1999). 
* Organisational strategy: SM – Spot Market;  CF – Contract Farming; VI – Vertical Integration (Plantation). + favours the organisational strategy; - does not favour the 
organisational strategy. 
** Scale: Scale of outgrower likely to be associated with the favoured characteristic under CF.  S – favours small scale outgrowers; ? – ambiguous effect on scale 
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Farm Household decision making process 
Agricultural households are the main form of economic organisation in developing countries 
with roughly 70 percent of the labour force in low-income countries employed in the agricultural 
sector (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986). Farm household, is defined, by Nakajima (1986), as an 
economic entity, which is a complex of the farm firm, the labourer’s household and the 
consumer’s household whose behavioural principle is utility maximisation. A farm firm due to 
the farm production activities utilising its own family labour, which in turn makes them 
labourer’s household, in order to obtain income based on the maximization behaviour. Being a 
consumer’s household, also based on maximization behaviour, its utility function, a pure 
consumer’s, contains family labour (Mukorera, 2001). 
In a household, the decision about production, consumption, and work are integrated into a 
single household problem which is under the households’ decision makers’ duty. Unlike a pure 
consumer, the household problem becomes utility maximisation subject to the production 
function, cash income and time constraint. The time constraint regards to the choice between 
work and home time, which excludes time that is spent directly in productive and labour market 
activities. The decision about the choice is on the level of household income, thus, production 
and work, which in turn influences consumption decisions. The only hinge between production 
and consumption decisions is the profit made in production. Since both the price of the 
agricultural produce and labour enter into both production and consumption decisions, the policy 
effect on each household will depend on whether the affected prices enter as a benefit or a cost to 
the household. The effect on household welfare of a price change will then depend on whether a 
household is a net seller or a net buyer of the product or factor affected by the price change 
(Mukorera, 2001). 
According to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), if perfect markets exist for all products and factors, 
including the different categories of family labour, all prices are exogenous to the household and 
all products and factors are tradable with no transaction costs. In this case, the decision prices for 
the household are the market prices, which in turn determine the opportunity cost of all products 
and factors owned by the household. With the assumption of zero transaction costs a household 
behaves as if production and consumption/work decisions were made sequentially. First a 
household make decisions on production, and then decisions on consumption follow subject to 
the agricultural income and income from other sources. Thus a household model is considered 
separable under such conditions (Mukorera, 2001). 
If there are market imperfections and the market is not used for a transaction, the household 
behaves as if markets existed within the household for the non-tradable product or factor the 
household own. The market equilibrium on this fictitious market determines a shadow price that 
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serves as the decision price for the household. Many households face different types of market 
failures and various levels of credit constraints. In such cases, the household’s problem is 
maximising utility subject to constraints such as cash, credit, production technology, and 
exogenous effective market prices for the tradable, and equilibrium conditions for non-tradable. 
When there are market imperfections, production by a particular household becomes a function 
of household characteristics and the quantity of productive resources a household controls 
(Mukorera, 2001). 
Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) concluded that yields were strongly influenced by manpower 
available to farm households in Niger which indicated that returns to land and labour were not 
equalised across households. Holden et al, (2001) found that there were significant market 
imperfections in labour and land markets in Ethiopia, and that these imperfections affected at the 
plot level land profitability. Heltberg (1998) found that market imperfections have efficiency 
implications on use of various productive resources owned by households and it has often been 
observed to influence significant inverse farm size-land productivity relationship (Mukorera, 
2001).  
A.6. Market Failures 
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Market Failures 
The standard theories of efficiency of competitive markets are based on the premise that there 
economic agents have perfect information, or more precisely, that the information held by 
individuals or firms is not affected by what they observe in the market and cannot be altered by 
any action they can undertake, including acquiring more information (Stiglitz, 1994). It is known 
that even most competitive economies of the world suffer from insufficiency supply of 
information. When there is informational asymmetry coupled by very high transaction costs, the 
market fails. There are no clear and concise definitions of market imperfections and market 
failures, and there is no clear distinction between them. As a result the two are often used 
interchangeably.  
A farm household is typically located in an environment characterised by a number of market 
failures for some of its products and factors. Because of the risk and asymmetrical information 
inherent in agriculture, formal financial institutions ration the amount of credit supplied to the 
small farm sector, giving rise to liquidity or credit constraints, according to Carter (1988). 
Formal lending institutions normally require collateral in form real assets as a precondition for 
offering loans. Most small farmers do not have titles to their small pieces of land (Mukorera, 
2001). The resulting lack of liquidity, during planting and growing seasons limits the farmers to 
rent in labour and land, and to purchase inputs. 
Related to the prices, market failure can occur when wide price margins between the selling and 
buying prices of a commodity or factor at the household level. The price margins can widen 
because of high transaction costs, shallow local markets and price risks or risk aversiveness of 
the farmer. Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) poitout that transaction costs include distance from the 
market and poor infrastructure that increase transportation costs, high market margins due to 
merchants with a local monopsony power, high search and recruitment costs due to imperfect 
information, and supervision and incentive costs on hired labour. Thus exclusion of certain 
households from certain markets can happen (Mukorera, 2001). 
A.7. Pricing arrangements in CF scheme 
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Pricing arrangements in CF scheme 
Price Formulas Strengths Weaknesses 
Administered prices 
(government sets price for 
product and processor) 
Producer and processor 
protected from market risk 
Government or consumer carries 
the market risk. Benefits maynot 
be distributed equitably between 
producers and processors. 
Contract growing (growers price 
fixed, residue taken by 
processor) 
Producers protected from 
financial risk 
Producers do not benefit from 
profits at times of high 
commodity prices. Processor 
may lose money at periods of 
low prices. 
Contract processing (processors 
price fixed, residue taken by 
grower) 
Processor protected from risk. 
Producer retains bulk of profit at 
period of high prices. 
Producers bear total risk and 
may stop deliveries at periods of 
low prices. Processor has 
reduced incentive to maximize 
efficiency. 
Revenue sharing (profit 
distributed in agreed proportion 
between producer and 
processor) 
Market risk shared between 
producer and processor.Benefits 
shared between producer and 
processor giving each the 
incentive to improve efficiency. 
----- 
Free bargaining (open market 
system): ----- ----- 
i) Flexible prices 
Known price formula: the price 
calculation base (agreed 
processing and other costs, 
world market prices) is known 
by everyone. 
Both producers and processors 
are subject to the world market 
price fluctuation. 
ii) Calculated on spot market 
values 
Producers can benefit from the 
high market prices. 
Price formula unknown by 
producers. Disagreements on 
what constitutes the market 
price. 
iii) On consignment basis ----- Prices calculated after the produce is marketed and sold. 
iv) Split pricing 
Possibility of receiving twice for 
one seasons marketable 
produce. 
Time spam between the 1st price 
(agreed base price) and the 2nd 
price (dependent on the market) 
might be long. Both producers 
and processors are subject to the 
world market price fluctuation. 
Source: Adapted from Baumann (2000) and Eaton and shepherd (2001). 
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Characteristics of contract farming structures 
Structure - Model Sponsor (Processor) General Characteristics 
Centralized Private corporate sector State development agencies 
Directed CF. Popular in many 
developing countries for 
highvalue crops. Commitment 
to provide material and 
management inputs to farmers. 
Nucleus State 
State development agencies 
Private/public plantations 
Private corporate sector 
Directed CF. Recommended for 
tree crops, e.g. oil palm, where 
technical transfer through 
demonstration is required. 
Popular for resettlement 
schemes. Commitment to 
provide material and 
management inputs to farmers. 
Multipartite 
Sponsorship by various 
organizations, e.g. 
• State development agencies 
• State marketing authorities 
• Private corporate sector 
• Landowners 
• Farmer cooperatives 
Common joint-venture 
approach. Unless excellent 
coordination between sponsors, 
internal management difficulties 
likely. Usually, contract 
commitment to provide material 
and management inputs to 
farmers. 
Informal developer 
Entrepreneurs 
Small companies 
Farmer cooperatives 
Not usually directed farming. 
Common for short-term crops; 
i.e. fresh vegetables to 
wholesalers or supermarkets. 
Normally minimal processing 
and few inputs to farmers. 
Contracts on an informal 
registration or verbal basis. 
Transitory in nature. 
Intermediary (tripartite) Private corporate sector State development agencies 
Sponsors are usually from the 
private sector. Sponsor control 
of material and technical inputs 
varies widely. At time sponsors 
are unaware of the practice 
when illegally carried out by 
large-scale farmers. Can have 
negative consequences. 
Source: Adapted from Eaton and Shepherd (2001). 
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Lessons from experience with Contract Farming1 
The main lessons from the experience with contract farming emerging from the literature reveal a number of factors 
that determine the success of contract farming ventures. In general, it can be argued that the chances of success will 
be enhanced if the following measures are taken: 
[ The farmer partners should be properly screened. 
[ The country-specific historical and institutional legacies that have shaped local conditions should be taken 
into account in project design. 
[ Commodities requiring more labour-intensive production techniques should be selected. A crop that requires 
low levels of mechanization and high labour inputs may not be suited to large producers, who could have the 
same labour and supervision problems as plantations. The production of a commodity that is delicate, highly 
perishable, involves a high level of labour inputs and a low level of mechanization, and that needs a high 
degree of coordination, technology inputs and tight quality specificity is better suited to contract farming 
involving small farmers. (As discussed in Section 5, the danger still exists that agribusiness could prefer 
contract arrangements with large-scale farmers.) 
[ Crops displaying a high value per hectare, as well as requiring post-harvest facilities that are not feasible for 
the farmer, should be selected. Commodities with high transaction costs in marketing and processing and 
economies of scale higher in the marketing chain are the crops ideally suited for some form of vertical 
integration, such as contract farming. 
[ Mutual asset specificity between the contracting partners should be incorporated, thus raising the exit costs for 
both partners and ensuring a much more stable and sustainable relationship. 
[ The location and concentration of growers in relationship to the location of the agribusiness firm and other 
logistical factors should be optimized. 
[ If a competitive local market is present, contracted farmers may choose to sell to the fresh market instead of 
the contracting firm, who is often unable to legally enforce contractual obligations. Serious disruption to input 
supplies to farmers can result in such a situation. 
[ The legal system should be well-developed, strong and respected, ensuring contract enforcement at minimal 
costs. 
[ Contractual relations should be well managed and based on mutual trust. The perceived high levels of contract 
manipulation by agribusiness firms, distrust by farmers of the contractual relationship, and a perception of 
loss of autonomy have characterized contract farming in developing countries. Removing all elements of 
mistrust and establishing trustworthy relationships are important measures for success. 
[ Farmer interests should be well represented in contract negotiations. In this respect, the formation of farmer 
cooperatives in a contract farming arrangement is seen as the most cost-effective way to represent the interests 
of the contracted farmer, as well as for the integrator to deliver inputs and services to the individual farms. 
[ Agribusiness should play a key role in coordinating farmers’ access to a range of inputs, services and 
facilities. These could include promoting literacy, improving business skills, fostering farmer links with 
agribusiness and banks, establishing a facility for resolving conflicts, infrastructure development. 
 
1 In Kirsten and Sartorius (2002), Linking agribusiness and small-scale farmers in developing countries: Is there a new role for Contract 
Farming?, page 9. 
Appendix B 
Empirical build up 
Table B.1. Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable Type Description 
Dependent Variable – Household’s Credit Source 
hh_creds Dummy 
1 = credit source as the 
Processing company; 0 = 
Otherwise  
Credit risk indicators 
hh_farmr Discrete Farming activity risk proxy1
hh_def_a Discrete Proxy for default on credit2
hh_tiph Discrete Total Income per household3
Asstarea Discrete Ratio of assets over area4
Household’s assets endowment, for farming, characteristics 
hh_ofn Discrete Owned number of fields 
hh_ola Discrete Owned area in hectares 
hh_ran Discrete Total number of hand tools assets 
hh_tan Discrete Total number of capital assets 
lnhh_size Discrete House hold size controlled for the number of childrens. 
Household Head Educational characteristic’s Dummies 
hhh_ilit Dummy 1= Illiterate; 0 = Otherwise 
hhh_ep1 Dummy 1 = Fist grid Primary school; 0 = Otherwise 
hhh_ep2 Dummy 1 = Second grid Primary school; 0 = Otherwise 
hhh_sec Dummy 1 = Secondary school; 0 = Otherwise 
Household Head Demographic characteristic’s Dummies 
hh_head Dummy 1= Male; 0 = Female 
hhh_020 Dummy 1 = Less than 20 years; 0 = Otherwise 
hhh_2040 Dummy 1 = Between 20 and 40 years; 0 = Otherwise 
hhh_400 Dummy 1 = More than 40 years; 0 = Otherwise 
Household’s activities characteristics 
hh_ccpro Discrete Proportion of land for the cash crop farming 
hh_fcpro Discrete Proportion of land for the food crop farming 
hh_fb Discrete Working in the farming sector 
hh_ob Discrete Working in other type of business 
Tobacco related indicators 
tobsal_a Discrete Revenue from tobacco sale 
credre_a Discrete Value of the Credit repaid 
credva_a Discrete Value of the credit acquired 
Agro industry (the CF contractor) 
empdum1 Dummy 1 = MLT; 0 = Otherwise 
empdum2 Dummy 1 = DIMMON; 0 = Otherwise 
Location dummy 
distdum1 Dummy 1 = Angónia; 0 = Otherwise 
distdum2 Dummy 1 = Chifunde; 0 = Otherwise 
                                                 
1 Derived by the following formula: fieldscropsfarmrhh =_  at household level. 
2 Derived as follows: ( )atobsalacredreadefhh __1__ −= . 
3 Derived by the following formula: sizehhtotinctincphhh __ = . 
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4 Derived as follows: ( ) olahhranhhhh __tan_ + . 
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distdum3 Dummy 1 = Macanga; 0 = Otherwise 
distdum4 Dummy 1 = Marávia; 0 = Otherwise 
*The farming activity is the only one which is not computed as net income, but sales revenue. 
**Given by parents, Borrowed by friends or parents, and others. 
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Table B.2. Descriptive statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variables Sample N Mean Std. Deviation t-statistic1
All 406 0.441 0.497 
Under CF 165 0.830 0.377 hh_creds 
Outside CF 241 0.174 0.380 
-2.488 
All 406 -581.683 25,069.830 
Under CF 165 886.643 3,750.925 hh_tiph 
Outside CF 241 -1,586.969 32,380.187 
-0.186 
All 406 4.510 3.095 
Under CF 165 1.943 1.016 hh_farmr 
Outside CF 241 6.267 2.799 
2.634 
All 393 -0.581 6.244 
Under CF 152 -2.137 9.861 hh_def_a 
Outside CF 241 0.401 0.000 
7.090 
All 252 2.798 1.776 
Under CF 165 3.189 1.855 asstarea 
Outside CF 87 2.056 1.340 
1.566 
All 406 2.443 1.356 
Under CF 165 3.164 1.345 hh_ofn 
Outside CF 241 1.950 1.124 
-1.688 
All 406 4.205 5.247 
Under CF 165 7.450 5.757 hh_ola 
Outside CF 241 1.984 3.409 
-1.965 
All 405 11.933 12.762 
Under CF 165 16.533 17.587 hh_ran 
Outside CF 240 8.771 6.198 
-1.113 
All 406 3.722 5.066 
Under CF 165 4.988 5.429 hh_tan 
Outside CF 241 2.855 4.616 
-0.794 
All 406 1.617 0.490 
Under CF 165 1.699 0.425 lnhh_siz 
Outside CF 241 1.560 0.524 
-0.533 
All 406 0.377 0.485 
Under CF 165 0.236 0.426 hhh_ilit 
Outside CF 241 0.473 0.500 
0.920 
All 406 0.384 0.487 
Under CF 165 0.479 0.501 hhh_ep1 
Outside CF 241 0.320 0.467 
0.167 
All 406 0.091 0.288 
Under CF 165 0.133 0.341 hhh_ep2 
Outside CF 241 0.062 0.242 
-0.465 
All 406 0.030 0.170 
Under CF 165 0.073 0.260 hhh_sec 
Outside CF 241 0.000 0.000 
-0.809 
All 406 0.823 0.382 
Under CF 165 0.933 0.250 hh_head 
Outside CF 241 0.747 0.436 
-0.919 
All 406 0.025 0.155 
Under CF 165 0.018 0.134 hhh_020 
Outside CF 241 0.029 0.168 
0.132 
hhh_2040 All 406 0.498 0.501 -0.458 
                                                 
1 The t-statistics refers to t-tests comparing the means of the two samples, and all are under p<0.05.  
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Under CF 165 0.570 0.497 
Outside CF 241 0.448 0.498 
All 406 0.525 0.500 
Under CF 165 0.467 0.500 hhh_400 
Outside CF 241 0.564 0.497 
0.368 
All 406 0.208 0.220 
Under CF 165 0.312 0.214 hh_ccpro 
Outside CF 240 0.137 0.195 
-1.505 
All 406 0.230 0.311 
Under CF 165 0.567 0.218 hh_fcpro 
Outside CF 241 0.000 0.000 
-3.434 
All 406 0.569 0.587 
Under CF 165 0.570 0.700 hh_ob 
Outside CF 241 0.568 0.496 
-0.004 
All 406 0.544 0.499 
Under CF 165 0.939 0.239 hh_fb 
Outside CF 241 0.274 0.447 
-2.517 
All 406 9,304,000.00 9,143,189.54 
Under CF 165 9,304,000.00 14,368,231.30 credva_a 
Outside CF 241 9,304,000.00 0.000 
0.000 
All 406 10,227,302.65 12,252,547.92 
Under CF 165 10,227,302.65 19,254,489.01 tobsal_a 
Outside CF 241 10,227,302.65 0.000 
0.000 
All 406 6,170,602.50 7,197,907.68 
Under CF 165 6,170,602.50 11,311,282.77 credre_a 
Outside CF 241 6,170,602.50 0.000 
0.000 
All 406 0.224 0.418 
Under CF 165 0.552 0.499 empdum1 
Outside CF 241 0.000 0.000 
-2.491 
All 406 0.182 0.387 
Under CF 165 0.448 0.499 empdum2 
Outside CF 241 0.000 0.000 
-2.188 
All 406 0.446 0.498 
Under CF 165 0.218 0.414 distdum1 
Outside CF 241 0.602 0.491 
1.453 
All 406 0.182 0.387 
Under CF 165 0.448 0.499 distdum2 
Outside CF 241 0.000 0.000 
-2.188 
All 406 0.133 0.340 
Under CF 165 0.224 0.418 distdum3 
Outside CF 241 0.071 0.257 
-0.853 
All 406 0.239 0.427 
Under CF 165 0.109 0.313 distdum4 
Outside CF 241 0.328 0.470 
0.966 
 − v −
 
Table B.3. Odds ratio logistic regression results 
Logit hh_creds odds 
ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
β 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
P>|z| 0.149* 0.118* 0.022* 0.048* 0.065* 0.212* 0.064* 0.0484* hh_tiph 
eβ 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 
β 0.5709 0.6571 0.6505 0.7754 0.8019 0.8077 0.8034 0.9307 
P>|z| 0.000* 0.012* 0.006* 0.196* 0.241* 0.256* 0.247* 0.708* hh_farmr 
eβ 1.769859 1.92919 1.916499 2.171461 2.229773 2.242744 2.233121 2.536284 
β 0.9253 0.9043 0.9041 0.9059 0.9311 0.9310 0.9319 0.9624 
P>|z| 0.120* 0.067* 0.056* 0.098* 0.168* 0.126* 0.170* 0.466* hh_def_a 
eβ 2.522625 2.470202 2.469708 2.474158 2.537299 2.537045 2.539329 2.617972 
β 1.222 0.7994 0.7537 0.7397 0.7456 0.7558 0.7457 0.7432 
P>|z| 0.168* 0.087* 0.033* 0.029* 0.035* 0.039* 0.036* 0.071* asstarea 
eβ 3.393969 2.224206 2.124847 2.095307 2.107706 2.129314 2.107916 2.102653 
β - 1.4732 1.4190 1.8819 1.7860 1.7465 1.7778 1.4216 
P>|z| - 0.074* 0.127* 0.006* 0.009* 0.012* 0.010* 0.244* hh_ofn 
eβ - 4.363175 4.132985 6.565968 5.965543 5.734497 5.916825 4.143745 
β - 0.8363 0.8058 0.8435 0.8801 0.8893 0.8800 0.8702 
P>|z| - 0.665* 0.007* 0.062* 0.225* 0.252* 0.225* 0.137* hh_ola 
eβ - 2.307812 2.238487 2.324488 2.411141 2.433426 2.4109 2.387388 
β - 1.3147 1.3280 1.3230 1.3708 1.3611 1.3700 1.2978 
P>|z| - 0.001* 0.001* 0.010* 0.003* 0.002* 0.004* 0.002* hh_ran 
eβ - 3.723634 3.773489 3.754669 3.9385 3.900481 3.935351 3.661233 
β - 1.0621 1.0573 0.9921 0.9933 0.9941 0.9923 0.9518 
P>|z| - 0.165* 0.266* 0.899* 0.915* 0.924* 0.904* 0.541* hh_tan 
eβ - 2.892439 2.878588 2.696892 2.70013 2.702291 2.697431 2.590368 
β - 0.8599 0.9097 0.7948 0.6576 0.6427 0.6622 1.0273 
P>|z| - 0.702* 0.907* 0.654* 0.495* 0.459* 0.507* 0.964* lnhh_siz 
eβ - 2.362924 2.483577 2.213998 1.930154 1.901608 1.939054 2.793513 
β - - 0.4703 0.4149 0.5045 0.5019 0.5032 0.2120 
P>|z| - - 0.419* 0.431* 0.601* 0.589* 0.601* 0.225* hhh_ilit 
eβ - - 1.600474 1.51421931 1.656157 1.651857 1.654006 1.236148 
β - - 0.8425 1.2194 1.7057 1.2761 1.7238 0.4047 
P>|z| - - 0.841* 0.849* 0.669* 0.843* 0.666* 0.407* hhh_ep1 
eβ - - 2.322165 3.38515603 5.505238 3.58264 5.60579 1.498853 
β - - 0.2371 0.1968 0.1930 0.1363 0.1956 0.0240 
P>|z| - - 0.116* 0.132* 0.205* 0.130* 0.210* 0.014* hhh_ep2 
eβ - - 1.267568 1.21750052 1.212883 1.146026 1.21604 1.02429 
β - - 0.7713 1.0270 1.3122 1.0206 1.3182 0.2251 
P>|z| - - 0.838* 0.985* 0.870* 0.989* 0.870* 0.316* hhh_sec 
eβ - - 2.162576 2.79267523 3.714336 2.774859 3.736689 1.252448 
β - - 3.1417 2.6999 2.7238 3.0265 2.7101 2.9644 
P>|z| - - 0.034* 0.075* 0.095* 0.075* 0.096* 0.177* hh_head 
eβ - - 23.14318 14.8782438 15.23812 20.62492 15.03078 19.38307 
β - - 0.6662 0.2949 0.2638 0.4242 0.2589 0.7089 
P>|z| - - 0.580* 0.132* 0.155* 0.419* 0.154* 0.728* hhh_020 
eβ - - 1.946825 1.34299205 1.301868 1.528367 1.295504 2.031755 
β - - 0.3003 0.1747 0.1034 0.1104 0.1043 0.1199 
P>|z| - - 0.221* 0.041* 0.028* 0.051* 0.027* 0.012* hhh_2040 
eβ - - 1.350264 1.1908889 1.108935 1.116725 1.109933 1.127384 
β - - 0.3334 0.2339 0.1610 0.1548 0.1629 0.1630 
P>|z| - - 0.171* 0.092* 0.065* 0.087* 0.064* 0.026* hhh_400 
eβ - - 1.395705 1.26351813 1.174685 1.167424 1.176919 1.177037 
hh_ccpro β - - - 15,713.83 42,246.38 29,890.04 44,142.19 412,411.3 
 − vi −
P>|z| - - - 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
eβ - - - (too large to be computed) 
β - - - 17.2201 19.9165 8.0616 19.5965 0.4552 
P>|z| - - - 0.008* 0.006* 0.075* 0.006* 0.723* hh_fcpro 
eβ - - - 30101935 446299139 3170.359 3.24E+08 1.576489 
β - - - 1.3584 1.6781 1.5062 1.6942 1.7749 
P>|z| - - - 0.316* 0.130* 0.240* 0.130* 0.165* hh_ob 
eβ - - - 3.889964 5.35537109 4.509562 5.44229 5.899691 
β - - - 2.1953 2.1854 1.9253 2.1754 0.8159 
P>|z| - - - 0.201* 0.227* 0.324* 0.226* 0.770* hh_fb 
eβ - - - 8.982695 8.89420552 6.857206 8.805707 2.26121 
β - - - - 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
P>|z| - - - - 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.000* credva_a 
eβ - - - - 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 
β - - - - 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
P>|z| - - - - 0.233* 0.474* 0.221* 0.960* tobsal_a 
eβ - - - - 2.718282 2.718282 2.718282 2.718282 
β - - - - 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 1.000 
P>|z| - - - - 0.083* 0.053* 0.098* 0.811* credre_a 
eβ - - - - 2.71801 2.71801 2.71801 2.718282 
β - - - - - 3.6206 - 234.4864 
P>|z| - - - - - 0.011* - 0.007* empdum1 
eβ - - - - - 37.35998 - 6.9E+101 
β - - - - - - 1.0962 - 
P>|z| - - - - - - 0.876* - empdum2 
eβ - - - - - - 2.992772 - 
β - - - - - - - 0.0067 
P>|z| - - - - - - - 0.008* distdum1 
eβ - - - - - - - 1.006722 
β - - - - - - - 0.0748 
P>|z| - - - - - - - 0.201* distdum3 
eβ - - - - - - - 1.077669 
β - - - - - - - 0.0058 
P>|z| - - - - - - - 0.018* distdum4 
eβ - - - - - - - 1.005817 
Number of 
obs 
 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
Prob > chi2  0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.2869 0.4232 0.4590 0.5683 0.5978 0.6062 0.5979 0.6661 
P > |t|  0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 0.000*,** 
*At 95 % significance; ** At 99% significance. 
 − vii −
Table B.4. Linear regression results 
Reg hh_tiph (1) (2) 
hh_creds -1,085.8160 -1093.5310
P>|t| 0.248* 0,243*
hh_farmr -51.0811 -60.2888
P>|t| 0.339* 0.255*
asstarea -135.0103 -127.3049
P>|t| 0.405* 0.426*
hh_ofn -107.3152 -100.9098
P>|t| 0.495* 0.514*
hh_ola -97.1331 -95.1259
P>|t| 0.218* 0.224*
hh_ran 39.4660 38.9564
P>|t| 0.225* 0.231*
hh_tan 34.3388 33.6901
P>|t| 0.646* 0.655*
lnhh_siz -764.7078 -777.5770
P>|t| 0.010* 0.009*
hhh_ilit 48.5695 52.2473
P>|t| 0.922* 0.916*
hhh_ep1 826.5695 817.6441
P>|t| 0.127* 0.131*
hhh_ep2 345.9105 342.2291
P>|t| 0.632* 0.636*
hhh_sec 1538.2640 1546.6740
P>|t| 0.309* 0.303*
hh_head 140.6980 174.9096
P>|t| 0.593* 0.504*
hhh_020 -18.0369 10.9133
P>|t| 0.984* 0.990*
hhh_2040 1556.8470 1556.8140
P>|t| 0.184* 0.184*
hhh_400 1586.7300 1574.485
P>|t| 0.212* 0.217*
hh_ccpro 922.0289 874.1382
P>|t| 0.269* 0.305*
hh_fcpro 967.9120 912.1123
P>|t| 0.441* 0.462*
hh_ob 649.3870 655.4203
P>|t| 0.010* 0.010*
hh_fb 505.5577 510.0466
P>|t| 0.040* 0.041*
distdum1 -887.6316 -
(P>|t|) 0.215* -
distdum2 - 950.9512
P>|t| - 0.190*
distdum3 -932.2982 -
P>|t| 0.218* -
distdum4 -1174.3530 -
 − viii −
P>|t| 0.136* -
_cons 437.9461 -504.8762
P>|t| 0.826* 0.750*
Number of obs 252 252
Prob > F 0.1507 0.1813
R – Squared 0.1236 0.1226
*At 95 % significance. 
 
